The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures

Caron, David D.

doi:10.2307/2203905

Cited by 37 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…In the studies of norms through socialization, the line is thus rapidly blurred between the “is” and the “ought” and the descriptive blends into the prescriptive 3 . Whaling offers a case in point, where the scholarly assessment of the anti‐whaling norm’s progression around the globe is over‐layered with the sense that this is a desirable outcome—that, in other words, the norm’s progression constitutes progress (see notably Scarff 1977; M’Gonigle 1980; Birnie 1985; Nadelmann 1990; Peterson 1992; Caron 1995; Stoett 1997; Mitchell 1998). To the extent that even more recent efforts to re‐assess the norm’s progression remain trapped in these unidirectional and normatively laden cognitive frames, as we will see in the next section.…”

Section: An Implicit Liberal Normative Teleology: Bettering the Sociamentioning

confidence: 99%

Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?1

Epstein

2012

International Studies Perspectives

123

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Section: An Implicit Liberal Normative Teleology: Bettering the Sociamentioning

confidence: 99%

Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?1

Epstein

2012

International Studies Perspectives

123

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“…First, there seems to be strong economic pressure on potential dissenters to remain within the diplomatic framework. Caron [1995] cites concrete instances of such pressure, which revolve around trade restrictions and access to fishing waters, and concludes that "..but for such sanctions, several states, including Iceland, Japan, Norway, and the Soviet Union, would have opted out of the moratorium and continued commercial whaling." 11 The diplomatic cost of leaving the IWC might therefore be so high that Japan prefers to operate within the IO framework instead, recruiting new members and buying the votes of existing ones.…”

Section: Vote-buyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foreign aid and voting in international organizations: Evidence from the IWC

Dippel

2015

Journal of Public Economics

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I use a unique dispute between major aid donors in the International Whaling Commission (IWC) to investigate whether donor nations change their aid giving in response to changes in aid recipients' voting behavior inside international organizations (IOs). This relationship is difficult to pin down in most IOs because agenda items constantly change and donor coalitions fluctuate with them. I exploit the fact that the IWC has, on the one hand, seen two fixed aid donor blocs opposing each other for three decades over a single issue, but has on the other hand seen rich variation in both membership and voting behavior of aid recipient countries. Using an identification strategy that relates changes in bilateral aid to within-recipient variation in IWC voting-bloc affiliation and fixed cross-sectional variation in donors' voting bloc, the evidence suggests that Japan rewards joining the pro-whaling bloc, and that countries who recently experienced aid reductions from the three big anti-whaling donors -the U.S., the U.K., and France -are more likely to join the pro-whaling bloc.

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“…26 Since then, small cetacean regulation has been continuously debated, with neither side gaining the upper hand. The issue became more prominent in late 1960s and peaked at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, in particular because of increasing interest in environmental and conservation causes.…”

Section: Small Cetaceans and The Icrwmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Size Matter? The ICRW and the Inclusion of Small Cetaceans

Stephenson

Mooers

Attaran

2014

TEL

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The competency debate over small cetacean regulation at the International Whaling Commission (IWC) is legal in nature, yet has been in a political stalemate for years. In this article we argue that the IWC has the competence to regulate small cetaceans and that the commercial whaling of 'small cetaceans' is a violation of the moratorium on commercial whaling. We present hybrid legal and scientific arguments and counter-arguments for the treaty interpretation of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and, given recent precedent, advocate that the International Court of Justice be called upon to resolve this matter.

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The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures

Cited by 37 publications

References 2 publications

Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?1

Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?1

Foreign aid and voting in international organizations: Evidence from the IWC

Does Size Matter? The ICRW and the Inclusion of Small Cetaceans

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