The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem

Heyd, David

doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-5697-0_1

Cited by 59 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…On the first point, we should recall that the oft-cited "non-identity problem" is a problem precisely because there is a huge difference between my harming some existing person and acting so as to create the very person whose sufferings can be traced to me. The fact that the person's very existence depends on my 'harming' them produces an extraordinary puzzle, and it is not at all clear that common-sense terms like "self-indulgent" apply at all to someone who fails to avoid this metaphysically bizarre form of "harming" (Heyd, 2009).…”

Section: Self-indulgencementioning

confidence: 99%

What Is the Question to which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?

Smyth

2020

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Often, we can best understand the nature and significance of a philosophical theory by getting clear on the question it is meant to answer. 1 Here, for example, are some questions that moral philosophers might help us to answer: 1. Which actions should I take? 2. Which actions of mine will best promote valuable outcomes? 3. Which types of actions will best promote valuable outcomes? 4. What are the most valuable outcomes? These questions are prima facie distinct, and it would require substantive argument to show that two of them are, contrary to appearances, identical. They lie on a familiar continuum that begins with practical inquiry conducted from within a first-personal, situated perspective and ends with a detached, theoretical inquiry into which possible world is the best one. In this paper, I will argue that a wide range of positions in procreative ethics may well be of no practical relevance to people who are deliberating about whether to procreate. This is because these positions are primarily answers to the third and fourth types of question, and because their authors have not even tried to connect those answers to the first-personal, deliberative question of how an agent should think about her decision to have children. I will not argue that this gap cannot be bridged, but I will stress that this is a serious collective failing, one that needs remedying if procreative ethics is to be anything more than a mere philosopher's game. Along the way, I will develop an account of what has been rather unfortunately termed "the right to procreate" (Cutas, 2009; Quigley, 2010; Robertson, 1996). On my account, there is in fact no such right or permission, as these deontic concepts do not capture the normative significance of procreation in an individual human life. Rather, I will argue, a person's reasons to procreate are often profoundly subjective and existential, located in a normative space that is distinct from the domain of objective morality. 1 I owe this more general idea to R.G. Collingwood, who believed that propositions are not fully understood unless seen in light of the questions they are meant to answer. See (Collingwood, 1939, pp. 25-43).

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Section: Self-indulgencementioning

confidence: 99%

What Is the Question to which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?

Smyth

2020

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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“…Now, the discussion about the non-identity problem has prevailed for a long time and a consensus has not been reached. Several philosophers aim to solve this paradox in different ways, either by arguing that there are reasons against any harm and reasons in favour of any benefit, those are views based on a harm-based account (Harman, 2004;Gardner, 2015); or by suggesting that there is not a problem at all and that we should accept the conclusion of the non-identity problem merely as an argument (Heyd, 2009;Boonin, 2014). However, irrespective of this on-going debate, I want to stress that the non-identity problem is not a problem that concerns me directly, because my proposal intends to elucidate that our way to achieve the best moral outcome regarding the future, cannot be achieved by conceptualizing into the future.…”

Section: The Non-identity Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

¿Tenemos obligaciones morales para con personas futuras? Tratando la vaguedad moral de escenarios medioambientales futuros

Bruneau

2018

Veritas

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In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with moral issues regarding future people and the environment. When it comes to the future, we have deontological and epistemic limitations. The closer to the present, the higher the certainty and the knowledge we have about facts. Thus, when we intend to find moral clarity regarding a future scenario, we deal with an inverse relation between certainty and time (the further to the future, uncertainty gets higher). The main problem is that most ways of dealing with moral issues about future scenarios do not address this relation, and rather focus on things that seem to simplify and clarify the uncertainties of the future. In response to this, I propose a different approach, one that operates neutrally and timelessly dealing with the uncertainties of the future while providing moral groundings that can help to clarify the future's state of moral vagueness.

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“…The second type of consequences is those which will be consequences for entities that are not those agents, and these I will call non‐agent‐affecting consequences. This is not to be confused with the debate over and distinction between impersonalism versus person‐affecting views about value . The distinction between agent‐affecting and non‐agent‐affecting consequences applies simply to the distinction between consequences which will affect agents and those which will not, and one can make it regardless of one's view on the impersonalism versus person‐affecting issue.…”

Section: Terms and Clarificationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should there be future people? A fundamental question for climate change and intergenerational justice

Sanklecha

2017

WIREs Climate Change

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The effects of climate change will be felt far into the future, long after currently living people have stopped existing. A popular way of understanding what this means ethically is to conceptualize the issue in terms of intergenerational justice: currently living people have duties of justice toward future generations to not wrongfully harm them, or duties to reduce the risk of violating the rights future people will have when they exist. In this article I show that this depends on assumptions about the existence, identity, and number of future people. I argue for the relevance and importance of ethically investigating these assumptions; in particular of asking: should humanity continue to exist? I argue that this ethical investigation is necessary to properly and fully understand the ethical challenges that climate change creates.

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The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem

Cited by 59 publications

References 21 publications

What Is the Question to which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?

What Is the Question to which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?

¿Tenemos obligaciones morales para con personas futuras? Tratando la vaguedad moral de escenarios medioambientales futuros

Should there be future people? A fundamental question for climate change and intergenerational justice

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