The intrinsic probability of theism

Abstract

In this paper, I explore one of the most important but least discussed components of an evidentialist case for or against theism: its intrinsic plausibility and simplicity as a theory aside from the evidence. This is a crucial consideration in any inductive framework, whether Inference to the Best Explanation, probabilism, or another. In the context of Bayesian reasoning, this corresponds to an assessment of theism's intrinsic probability. I offer a survey of how philosophers of science have attempted to evaluate the intrinsic plausibility and simplicity of scientific theories more generally, before applying these considerations to the question of God's existence.

Recent Work on Traditional Arguments for Theism I

“…And then there are broader epistemological questions about theory acceptance to consider. It may still be rational to reject a theory in the face of good arguments for it; perhaps there are better arguments against it, or it is inconsistent with other things you're justified in believing, or the theory is judged to have an insurmountably low intrinsic probability (on the intrinsic probability of theism, see Miller, 2018 and Poston, 2020). On the other hand, it may also be rational to accept a theory in the absence of good arguments for it, and in the face of good arguments against it.…”

Why God is probably good: a response to the evil-god challenge

“…15.In Miller (2018) I offer a fuller discussion of the constituents of simplicity; I offer here a brief summary for context.…”