The Iran Threat Network (ITN): Four Models of Iran's Nonstate Client Partnerships

Abstract

The Iran Threat Network (ITN) Four Models of Iran's Nonstate Client Partnerships N onstate clients became one of the key pillars of Iran's national security strategy and its gray zone activities following the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. 1 The regime began to enlist foreign forces during the Iran-Iraq War (1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988) and, since then, its network of proxies has grown exponentially. Today, Iran has tens of thousands of close allied fighters over whom it exerts near-complete control, and tens of thousands more with which it has real, but far more limited, ties and on whom it cannot rely in a crisis. Altogether, by some accounts, the number of these forces is estimated at approximately 200,000 (Jones, 2019). These fighters comprise the Iran Threat Network (ITN), a loose network of non-Iranian, nonstate groups supported by Tehran.Members of the ITN are diverse in their origins, ethnic and religious backgrounds and affiliation, status and influence within their countries, and relationship with Tehran. However, they are all nonstate actors having received some level of support from the Islamic Republic-organizational, financial, political, or military. Therefore, the ITN encompasses Iranian proxies and partners. The ITN is not simply a hub-and-spoke system with Iran in the center. Instead, different members of the ITN also interact with Lebanese Hizbullah (LH), Iran's most trusted and capable proxy, which is at the forefront of many of these interactions. Nevertheless, the ITN remains a loose network supported by Iran.