The iron law of Erdogan: the decay from intra-party democracy to personalistic rule

Lancaster, Caroline

doi:10.1080/01436597.2014.970866

Cited by 54 publications

(23 citation statements)

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“…Nevertheless, EU integration would prove difficult to achieve, as religious, political, and cultural issues were factors that made it harder for Turkey to become a member. For Zürcher (2017, p. 367), “the increasingly religious tone of the Erdoğan government contributed to the European unease,” as well as the increasingly undemocratic pathway the country proceeded down (Lancaster, 2014). Likewise, with the rise of far‐right parties in Europe, mainly post‐2008 crisis, and the consequent anti‐immigrant and anti‐Islam sentiment (Todorov, 2010), there was a growing opposition against Turkey's entry into the EU.…”

Section: A Turn To the Middle Eastmentioning

confidence: 99%

Erdoğan’s pragmatism and the ascension of AKP in Turkey: Islam and neo‐Ottomanism

Gontijo

Barbosa

2020

Digest Mid East Studies

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This article aimed to analyze the ascension of Justice and Development Party-Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)in Turkey and its political measures regarding both Islam and the country's Ottoman past, in order to comprehend the party's role in a potential shift of Turkish national identity and in Turkey's relationship with the Middle East. The article does this through a content analysis of decrees, laws, and other measures taken by the AKP that emphasizes its cultural and religious policies, as well as revisiting literature produced about the subject. Analyzing Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government during his time as Prime Minister (2003-2014), two noteworthy features come to light: its Islamic influence and its so-called neo-Ottomanist outlook.However, this article argues that besides an identity-and ideology-based motivation, the AKP had pragmatic intentions in adopting such approaches, aiming to gather support both domestically and regionally. K E Y W O R D SAKP, Erdoğan, Islam, Neo-Ottomanism, national identity

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Section: A Turn To the Middle Eastmentioning

confidence: 99%

Erdoğan’s pragmatism and the ascension of AKP in Turkey: Islam and neo‐Ottomanism

Gontijo

Barbosa

2020

Digest Mid East Studies

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“…Admittedly, today's Turkey does not conform faithfully, and I do not dispute recent elections and referenda. Figuring prominently in past characterizations of southern European authoritarianism (e.g., from O'Donnell et al., to Söyler, ), since May 2013, Turkey again features in accounts as authoritarian, totalitarian, sultan‐like, or otherwise dictatorial and antidemocratic (e.g., Akyol, ; Economist, ; Iğsız, ; Kandiyoti, ; Lancaster, ; Tuğal, ; Yeşil, ). Indeed, today's Turkey conforms clearly through its authoritarian conduct at executive scales with negligible effective checks at judicial and legislative scales, and it justifies routinely diminishing citizens’ rights through majority votes at legislative and national/general scales.…”

Section: Democratic Authoritarianism and Graffiti In Erdoğan's Turkeymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Also since 2013, and especially 2016, the state labels routinely criticism of all sorts – including graffiti – as terroristic. In 2013 and since, academics, journalists and NGOs also evaluated Gezi in terms of civil society, social mobilization, public space and social media struggles, urban politics, occupy movements, neoliberalism, civil liberties, human rights, and repression and resistance under democracy (e.g., Akçalı & Korkut, ; Amnesty International, , ; Batuman, ; Catterall, ; Göle, ; Gürcan & Peker, ; Lancaster, ; Musil, ; Özkırımlı, ; Turam, ). Graffiti conveyed protesters’ diverse concerns – often inventively, with caricatures, biting satire and vulgar yet trenchant humour.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Erasing the place of dissent: Inscriptions and eliminations of Gezi Park graffiti

Evered

2018

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Funding informationAsian Studies Program (ASN); Center for the Advanced Study of International Development (CASID); Center for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES); Muslim Studies Program (MSP); and Department of Geography, Environment, and Spatial Sciences Regarded commonly and policed routinely as disamenity and vandalism, graffiti nonetheless provide vital accounts of identity, territoriality and contestation. Of proportionate consequence, however, are the means by which societies and states act to deter and remove graffiti and how these efforts correspond with other projects to police a population, activism and dissidence, and public discourse. During and after the Gezi Park protests of 2013, Turkish authorities initiated on-theground anti-graffiti actions that resulted in a patchy assemblage of institutional beiges, greys, and other nondescript colours obscuring impacted surfaces, vertical and horizontal, throughout graffitied neighbourhoods. Conspicuous in its visual outcomes but otherwise conforming with the remediation standards of many states, officials went beyond these anticipated measures of removal to also suppress selectively reproductions and disseminations of graffiti imagery and verses.Beyond validating the transgressive potency of graffiti itself, these reactions illuminate further ongoing analyses of both the contestation of public places in and the political climate of present-day Turkey. In this study, I examine how, within these contexts, state authorities moved from painting over graffiti to situating purposefully dissident spaces both of expression and collective memory to align with the proscribed spaces of sedition and terrorism. Through this analysis, my study of the ongoing Gezi experience contributes to graffiti geographies as it reveals how regimes of policing can extend far beyond public spaces and defaced walls.

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“…As an extension of the unreserved personalisation of power around a single man, a charismatic authority has been established, which is surrounded by such forms of address as "master", "leader", "strong will", "tall man", "chief", and "the president of the people", "commander in chief", "leader of the Muslim World" and "the hope of the ummah" (Gürsel 2014). AKP has become a vehicle for the cult Unauthenticated Download Date | 5/12/18 7:25 PM of Erdoğan's persona and Erdoğan has become key to the existence of a neo-patrimonial AKP (Lancaster 2014(Lancaster , 1680. One reason why Erdoğan appears to be immune to accusations of fraud and corruption is that his cult of personality remains so pervasive and uncontested amongst his supporters (Lancaster 2014(Lancaster , 1684.…”

Section: Emergence Of the Islamist Autocracy (2013-)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…AKP has become a vehicle for the cult Unauthenticated Download Date | 5/12/18 7:25 PM of Erdoğan's persona and Erdoğan has become key to the existence of a neo-patrimonial AKP (Lancaster 2014(Lancaster , 1680. One reason why Erdoğan appears to be immune to accusations of fraud and corruption is that his cult of personality remains so pervasive and uncontested amongst his supporters (Lancaster 2014(Lancaster , 1684.…”

Section: Emergence Of the Islamist Autocracy (2013-)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Decline and Resurgence of Turkish Islamism: The Story of Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP

Yılmaz

Barton

Barry

2017

Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies

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ledge and its as soon d profits without the ain investigation also entation in its current narrative technique., period e entry into force and art of the literary porUniversity, 2 Pei-Ning University, 2 Pei-Ning er.This work is ives 4.0 License. Research Article Open AccessIhsan Yilmaz*, Greg Barton, James Barry Abstract: For decades, Turkish Islamists have failed to attract the votes of large sections of society and remained marginal. As a result of this failure to come to power, and due to domestic and international constraints and windows of opportunities, they have declared that they have jettisoned Islamism. Many Turkish Muslims whose religious disposition was shaped by the pluralistic urban Ottoman experience and small-town Anatolian traditionalism, and by the contesting currents of cosmopolitan pluralism and rural social conservatism, voted in favour of these former Islamists who have become "Muslim Democrats". This paper elaborates on the genealogy of Turkish Islamists and their political trajectories and argues that when the forces and constraints of domestic and external social, political and economic conditions disappeared and the opportunities derived from being Muslim Democrats no longer existed, the former Islamists easily returned to their original ideology, showing that despite assertions to the contrary their respect for democracy and pluralism had not truly been internalised. This paper also aims to demonstrate that similar to other authoritarian populists, Erdoganists perceive the state and its leader as more important than anything else and as being above everything else, which has culminated in a personality cult and sanctification of the state. As long as Turkey's economy continued to boom, almost everyone was happy that Turkey could readily market the "Muslim Democrats" story to the whole world for a long period as a major success story, or as an "exemplary Muslim country" or "model". Yet, Middle Eastern elites and Western forces got carried away and learnt the hard way just how naive their view was in perhaps the first great transformation movement of the twenty-first century -the Arab Spring. Likewise, the Turkish Spring turned all too quickly towards autumn and then winter.

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The iron law of Erdogan: the decay from intra-party democracy to personalistic rule

Cited by 54 publications

References 23 publications

Erdoğan’s pragmatism and the ascension of AKP in Turkey: Islam and neo‐Ottomanism

Erdoğan’s pragmatism and the ascension of AKP in Turkey: Islam and neo‐Ottomanism

Erasing the place of dissent: Inscriptions and eliminations of Gezi Park graffiti

The Decline and Resurgence of Turkish Islamism: The Story of Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP

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