The Judge as a Procedural Decision-Maker

Abstract

Abstract. Despite the abundance of studies exposing heuristic and biased thinking in judicial decision-making, the influence of this empirical work in court is limited. In this commentary, we address this paradox and argue that the disconnect between empirical work and practice stems from the limited knowledge and consideration of procedural rules. These shortcomings increase the skepticism of legal scholars and practitioners of this research and give an excuse for dismissing the findings, deeming them inapplicable in court. We suggest that the only way forward is by diversifying our research methods and by building a culture of collaboration, fostering research partnerships between legal scholars and (legal) decision-making researchers. This approach aims to bridge the gap between legal and social sciences and to promote the impact of empirical studies of the legal system on current legal practice.

The Psychology of Forensic Evidence

“…The issue closes with an opinion paper addressing the disconnect between the empirical work in legal decision-making and the current legal practice. Specifically, Sagana and van Toor (2020) argue that this disconnect stems from the limited consideration of procedural rules in empirical studies. This in turn increases the skepticism of legal scholars and practitioners of this research and serves as an excuse for dismissing empirical evidence.…”