The Judicialization of Politics in Germany

Abstract

Judicialization of politics means that more and more political questions are decided by courts and thereby political alternatives are reduced. In Germany it is the Federal Constitutional Court that is most involved in this process of judicialization. Members of Parliament contribute to this development by litigating far too often a lawsuit before the Constitutional Court and by carrying too far the consideration of legal arguments in legislation. Judges of the Constitutional Court contribute to the judicialization by sometimes exceeding their competences and by becoming involved in power politics. As the Constitutional Court has only a limited democratic legitimacy, it is detrimental to a democracy when such a court frequently decides on policy-making.

Access to treatment and the constitutional right to health in Germany: a triumph of hope over evidence?

“…In contrast, courts play a prominent role in German policy-making and citizens have a constitutional entitlement to take bodies of the public administration to court if they find that a decision infringes upon their constitutional rights (Landfried 1994).…”

Evidence Use in Health Policy Making

“…The judiciary can also have a role in holding the government and parliament to account, for example through the mechanisms of constitutional complaint or judicial review. In Germany, the Federal Government and Parliament tend to consult senior judges at the German Constitutional Court on policies that affect constitutional rights to avoid a retrospective "complaint of unconstitutionality" (Verfassungsklage) that can result in legislation being revoked and returned to legislators (Landfried 1994). There is no suggestion that courts are particularly interested or indeed equipped to advise other state bodies about matters of scientific evidence, as advice will be focused on aspects of legality and couched in legal terms only.…”

Parteien, Vetospieler und der Wettbewerb um Wählerstimmen: Die Arbeitsmarkt-und Beschäftigungspolitik der Ära Kohl

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