In the face of widespread dissatisfaction with contemporary democratic practice, there has been a growing interest in theories of deliberative democracy. However theorists have often failed to sufficiently address the question of institutional design. This paper argues that recent experiments with citizens' juries should be of interest to deliberative democrats. The practice of citizens' juries is considered in light of three deliberative democratic criteria: inclusivity, deliberation and citizenship. It is argued that citizens' juries offer important insights into how democratic deliberation could be institutionalized in contemporary political decision-making processes.The growing interest in forms of deliberative democracy indicates, on the one hand, a widespread dissatisfaction with aspects of our contemporary political practices and, on the other hand, a reflective awareness that alternative practices are plausible options for us. Within contemporary democratic theory, there is an emerging concern with the growing difference and distance between the subjectivity, motives and intentions of citizens and the political decisions made in their name. 2 The activities, backgrounds and interests of political representatives are seen as far removed from the lives and perspectives of citizens. Although periodic elections act as 'a continuous discipline on the elected to take constant notice of public opinion', 3 the mandate that representatives enjoy extends over a period within which citizens have very little impact on decisions made in their name. The principal-agent form of representation, so dominant within liberal democracies, rests on the fact that the political representative is able to deliberate and decide for others. 4 But, critics contend that the lack of presence or 'voice' of the politically marginalized, such as women and ethnic minorities, in political decision making means that their interests and perspectives are systematically excluded or at least not adequately addressed. As Phillips argues, 'when policies are worked out for rather than with a politically excluded constituency, they are unlikely to engage with all relevant concerns '. 5 Clearly political activity and influence extends beyond voting, and contemporary society is marked by a plurality of interest groups and associations. However such pluralism is undermined by the social and economic imbalances inherent within society. Expressions of economic power and social influence undermine, to a large extent, the assumption of political equality on which representative forms are frequently defended. 6 As Beetham argues: 'The freedoms of speech and association not only provide the guarantee of a more extensive political activity than the vote;