The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning

Mueller, Andy

doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03030-w

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 31 publications

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“…Opinions on what this norm is differ, and we aim for our analysis to be independent of any particular choice here-it should work regardless of what exactly the norm of practical reasoning turns out to be. A fairly popular idea, however, is that there is a knowledge norm in place (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008;Jackson, 2012;Mehta, 2016;Mueller, 2021;Williamson, 2005). Though there are variations across accounts, the basic idea is as follows: "Where one's choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p" (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008, p. 578).…”

Section: Norms Of Practical Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong

Buijsman

Veluwenkamp

2022

Minds & Machines

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Users of sociotechnical systems often have no way to independently verify whether the system output which they use to make decisions is correct; they are epistemically dependent on the system. We argue that this leads to problems when the system is wrong, namely to bad decisions and violations of the norm of practical reasoning. To prevent this from occurring we suggest the implementation of defeaters: information that a system is unreliable in a specific case (undercutting defeat) or independent information that the output is wrong (rebutting defeat). Practically, we suggest to design defeaters based on the different ways in which a system might produce erroneous outputs, and analyse this suggestion with a case study of the risk classification algorithm used by the Dutch tax agency.

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Section: Norms Of Practical Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong

Buijsman

Veluwenkamp

2022

Minds & Machines

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Knowledge and decision

et al. 2022

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Knowledge and acceptance

Heil

2023

AJPH

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In a recent paper, Jie Gao (Synthese 194:1901–17, 2017) has argued that there are acceptance-based counterexamples to the knowledge norm for practical reasoning (KPR). KPR tells us that we may only rely on known propositions in practical reasoning, yet there are cases of practical reasoning in which we seem to permissibly rely on merely accepted propositions, which fail to constitute knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that such cases pose no threat to a more broadly conceived knowledge-based view of practical reasoning. I will first motivate the view that rational acceptance depends on a knowledge-based condition being met. I will then show how KPR can be amended—yielding what I call KPR+—to include this condition. I will argue that KPR+ not only avoids Gao’s counterexample, but harbours additional explanatory power by providing an account of the normative role of acceptance in practical reasoning. Finally, I will defend KPR+ against objections by employing theoretical tools that are readily available to those sympathetic to knowledge-based views.

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The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning

Cited by 3 publications

References 31 publications

Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong

Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong

Knowledge and decision

Knowledge and acceptance

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