This interpretation is important, but not because it's the only way of reading Hayek. Rather, the lack of an appreciative perspective explains the various ways that Hayek's insights have been misconstrued. As Boettke (2018: 97) documents, neoclassical economists have at times claimed to build on Hayekian insights or inquiry. But in the process of formalization they have lost the essence of Hayek's discovery: that a great deal of relevant information for economic decision-making can only be discovered through processes of trial and error (Boettke, 1997; Boettke and O'Donnell, 2013). Boettke focuses on Hayek's engagement with and reception among economists. However, examples of these difficulties in translation also crop up among political theorists who have engaged with Hayek. Scholars of politics on the left have generally conceived Hayek as an intelligent 'enemy' who can help clarify the feasibility of some of their moral commitments but who cannot participate in the same project of establishing a truly just society (Griffiths, 2014). Nevertheless, there have been several attempts, increasingly successful, to integrate Hayekian insights into normative political philosophy (Schmidtz and Brennan, 2012; Tomasi, 2012a, 2012b). My aim, therefore, in this essay is to contribute to Boettke's project by bridging the gap between the Hayekian critique of social justice and its reception among normatively committed theorists and philosophers. I begin by summarizing some interrelated cases proposed by political theorists for rejecting Hayek's critique of social justice. I add to Boettke's resources some context around Hayek's epistemology that establishes quite how deep the problem of