We derive the optimal policy mix of Research and Development (R&D)-subsidies and corporate tax rates towards a footloose R&D-intensive firm. Increasing R&D-subsidies strengthens the firm's incentive to offshore production. The firm's home government can offset this by offering an appropriate corporate tax concession. The optimal policy package exhibits a "Matthew principle": higher R&Dsubsidies should typically be accompanied by lower tax rates. However, if the R&D-subsidy exceeds a crucial threshold, a tax concession can no longer prevent offshoring. We find that it is never optimal to raise tax rates as R&D-subsidies increase. 1 | INTRODUCTION In an era characterized by increasing globalization, the threat of domestic firms offshoring production to lower-cost locations is a major concern of governments in developed countries. Another, and at first sight unrelated worry policy makers tend to have, is losing ground in innovation and Research and Development (R&D). When designing policy to address these issues, it is important to realize that offshoring production and investing in R&D are not unrelated. In fact, empirical work shows that offshoring firms also tend to be more R&Dintensive. 1 Successful innovation itself tends to make firms larger and more efficient and thus better able to reap the benefits of offshoring. In this paper, we start by showing that, for this reason, policies that raise the level of firm innovation can also have implications for its internationalization strategy. As a result, well-intended direct R&D-support may have 1 Evidence is, for instance, provided by Dachs et al. (2015), who estimate the effects of production offshoring on R&D and innovation in the home country, using a data set of more than 3000 manufacturing firms from seven European countries.