This thesis studies the costs, benefits, and welfare impact of laws that protect debtors when they default. The first chapter evaluates the welfare impact of one of the main debtor protections in the United States: asset exemptions. Asset exemptions shield debtors' assets from seizure by unsecured creditors, and so provide insurance that increases consumption when debtors default. This default insurance is financed by higher interest rates when debtors repay. I derive a sufficient statistic formula for the welfare impact of increasing exemptions, which captures the benefits to debtors who default either in or out of bankruptcy. I then estimate the key components of the formula. First, using the PSID, I estimate the change in consumption that occurs when debtors default, which determines debtors' willingness to pay for default insurance. The estimated 5.5% consumption drop upon default implies that debtors are willing to pay, at most, 16.5% over the actuarially fair rate for default insurance. Second, using credit union data and changes in state exemption levels, I show that higher exemptions increase interest rates and decrease recoveries on charged-off debt. The estimates imply that exemptions generate default insurance, but the higher interest rates are marked up 320% over what is actuarially fair. Ultimately, since the actual markup substantially exceeds what debtors are willing to pay, lower exemptions would increase welfare. The second chapter investigates whether borrowers file more bankruptcies when asset exemption are higher. A higher exemption makes bankruptcy more attractive, but also reduces the supply of credit, so the equilibrium effect on bankruptcy filings is uncertain. The reduced-form literature finds conflicting evidence, generally using cross-sectional variation in exemptions across states. I use panel variation in exemptions, combined with state-and county-level data on bankruptcies, and find that a median-sized exemption increase raises Chapter 7 bankruptcy rates by 3-7%. Event study regressions show that bankruptcy rates rise immediately after an exemption increase and remain high for at least six years, so it is i Bibliography 136 v Chapter 1 Consumption Smoothing and Debtor Protections 1 Stavins (2000) reports that 8.5% of households have filed for bankruptcy, and more recently, Dobbie et al. (2016) reports that 15% of individuals have filed for bankruptcy based on their calculations in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data. VISA reports that 55-60% of charge-offs occur without a bankruptcy filing (NBRC, 1997). 2 The $100 billion in interest rate payments, reported in Akerlof and Shiller (2015), is obtained by multiplying the total credit card debt in 2009 (886 billion) by the average interest rate on revolving credit (0.134).