The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Bank Regulation?

Alford, Duncan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1341325

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…105(6)) that allowed the member states, acting unanimously, to confer on the ECB a leading role in financial supervision. But when national leaders in the Council of Ministers worked to revamp EU banking and financial market regulation in the early 2000s, they rejected the idea of centralizing regulatory authority in the hands of the ECB or another EU level regulator as a step too far toward regulatory integration (Alford, 2006). Instead, they chose to combine corporate self-regulation with the maintenance of national sovereignty through a multi-stage “Lamfalussy” process of European financial market regulation (Lamfalussy, 2001).…”

Section: Weak and Fragmented Banking Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration

Jones

Kelemen

Meunier

2015

Comparative Political Studies

354

200

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The European Union (EU) project of combining a single market with a common currency was incomplete from its inception. This article shows that the incompleteness of the governance architecture of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was both a cause of the euro crisis and a characteristic pattern of the policy responses to the crisis. We develop a “failing forward” argument to explain the dynamics of European integration using recent experience in the eurozone as an illustration: Intergovernmental bargaining leads to incompleteness because it forces states with diverse preferences to settle on lowest common denominator solutions. Incompleteness then unleashes forces that lead to crisis. Member states respond by again agreeing to lowest common denominator solutions, which address the crisis and lead to deeper integration. To date, this sequential cycle of piecemeal reform, followed by policy failure, followed by further reform, has managed to sustain both the European project and the common currency. However, this approach entails clear risks. Economically, the policy failures engendered by this incremental approach to the construction of EMU have been catastrophic for the citizens of many crisis-plagued member states. Politically, the perception that the EU is constantly in crisis and in need of reforms to salvage the union is undermining popular support for European integration.

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Section: Weak and Fragmented Banking Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration

Jones

Kelemen

Meunier

2015

Comparative Political Studies

354

200

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…15 The political fight over the CFPB's structure was largely focused by reacting promptly to market developments and benefitting from expertise of national supervisory authorities. As part of this process, the EU institutions agreed to accelerate the passage of financial services legislation and began applying to securities legislation in 2002 and to banking legislation in 2004 (Alford, 2006).…”

Section: Regulatory Governance and The Accountability Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

Financial stability rearticulated: institutional reform, post-crisis governance and the new regulatory landscape in the United States

Bieri

Building Responsive and Responsible Financial Regulators in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis

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The recent financial crisis was a powerful reminder that the inherent instability of the monetary-financial system is likely to entail serious consequences for the real economy. In the U.S., the monumental Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank Act") has provided legislation that aims to institutionalise several aspects a new thinking on financial stability. In addition to the interagency Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC"), the creation of the The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") marks an important departure from the U.S. regulatory tradition of decentralized agencies whereby the institutional locus of financial oversight depended on the precise nature of the legal structure of and business activities pursued by individual financial intermediaries. In its mandate and institutional structure, the CFPB unifies both "micro-prudential" and "macroprudential" principles of financial regulation to enhance overall financial stability. From an historical perspective, the creation of the CFPB does not change the regulatory landscape to the same extent as did the creation of the Federal Reserve after the Panic of 1907 or the creation of the FDIC after the 1933 Banking Crisis. At the same time, however, the CFPB represents an important historical shift in the policy focus of U.S. financial regulation away from bank stability bank to a broad notion of financial stability that recognises the increased financialisation of households' welfare.

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“…These committees had a mandate to provide advice to the Commission, and developed joint interpretation recommendations, guidelines and standards. Furthermore, they functioned as platforms to exchange best practice (Coen and Salter, 2019: 120;Alford, 2006). The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), created in 2004, assembled more than 50 national regulators, and entirely relied on their resources (Lastra, 2019: 12).…”

Section: Institutional Change -Incremental Versus Big Bangmentioning

confidence: 99%

EU Agencies in Banking and Energy between Institutional and Policy Centralisation

Eckert

2020

SSRN Journal

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The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Bank Regulation?

Cited by 9 publications

References 5 publications

Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration

Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration

Financial stability rearticulated: institutional reform, post-crisis governance and the new regulatory landscape in the United States

EU Agencies in Banking and Energy between Institutional and Policy Centralisation

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