The Law and Economics of Information Sharing: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Bennett, M; Collins, Philip

doi:10.5235/174410510792283754

Cited by 22 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Depending on the single school operating structure, this surplus, for which a target is set each year, is either normally stored in reserves for future expenses or, in 7 See European Commission (2011), 'Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements', paragraph 65. 8 See Bennett and Collins (2010). certain cases, transferred to the funding trust in the form of rents.…”

Section: Theory Of Harmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the Office of Fair Trading’s ‘fee-paying schools’ intervention

Pesaresi

Flanagan²,

Scott

et al. 2014

Eur J Law Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper assesses the impact of the 2006 OFT intervention addressing the anti-competitive exchange of information in the setting of school fees by a group of 50 schools in the United Kingdom. Availing of a large panel dataset of school fees and other schools' characteristics, the paper employs a differences-in-differences methodology to allow robust and statistically significant findings to be drawn. Evolution of school fees of the group of 50 infringing schools-subject to OFT treatment-is compared with a 'no-intervention' counterfactual scenario, informed by reference to a control group of 178 non-participating schools. The analysis controls for other factors that may influence the determination of fees, most notably the quality of the schools. The analysis finds the OFT intervention leads to a reduction of 1.6 % in the boarding fees of the infringing schools. This equates to savings of approximately £500 per boarder per term, and suggests consumer savings of around £85m may have been realised since intervention. Additional potential effects in spurring wider competitive responses by non-infringing schools are not considered in this analysis, and underline the conservative nature of the findings.

show abstract

Section: Theory Of Harmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the Office of Fair Trading’s ‘fee-paying schools’ intervention

Pesaresi

Flanagan²,

Scott

et al. 2014

Eur J Law Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The direct or indirect exchange of deliberately acquired productive information under an umbrella of the regulating competition policy is one of the contentious questions in current European competition law debate (see for example Bennett and Collins, 2010;Odudu, 2011). The effect of the EU competition law provisions and enforcement practices on entrepreneurial incentives for generation and utilisation of deliberately acquired productive information remains inconclusive and offers ample field for further research.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Horizontal exchange of information - institutional impact on entrepreneurial activity

Kotnik¹,

Kovač²

2012

PIEB

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates into the optimal innovation mechanisms and offers a legal evaluation of the optimal institutional framework under current EU anti-competitive provisions and provides a legal and economic analysis of its economic and business impacts. Analysis shows that current TFEU provisions on anti-competitive practices may deter generation and utilization of deliberately acquired productive information (entrepreneurial information) and may thus hinder optimal entrepreneurial activity.

show abstract

“…In addition to endogeneity, omitted variables-for example, sectoral demand fluctuations (Suslow 2005; Harrington and Skrzypacz 2011)-may drive both a cartel's duration and its decision regarding whether to adopt an organizational feature, producing misleading estimates on the impact of the feature. 5 For instance, increased demand volatility may lead to both increased complexity in formulating a "cartel contract" and increased difficulty in monitoring the "contract". This paper proposes an identification strategy for estimating the causal effect of the LSP on cartel duration employing instrumental variable estimation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The EC discovered cartel data set is an ideal choice for this identification strategy: 81 percent of the cartelized markets involve intermediate goods-so that customers are industrial buyers and thus price and sales are private information between a buyer and a seller (Harrington 5 Suslow provides empirical evidence that the more uncertain the environment within which a cartel operates, the shorter the expected cartel duration (p. 705). Harrington and Chang show that a cartel lasts longer if the firms earn less profit from cheating.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Lysine Strategy Profile and Cartel Duration: An Instrumental Variables Approach

Zhou¹

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Colluding firms often exchange private information and make transfers within the cartels based on the information. Estimating the impact of such collusive practices-known as the "lysine strategy profile (LSP)"-on cartel duration is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. I use firms' linguistic differences as an instrumental variable for the LSP in 135 cartels discovered by the European Commission since 1980. The incidence of the LSP is not significantly related to cartel duration. After correction for selectivity in the decision to use the LSP, statistical tests are consistent with a theoretic prediction that the LSP increases cartel duration.

show abstract

The Law and Economics of Information Sharing: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Cited by 22 publications

References 16 publications

Evaluating the Office of Fair Trading’s ‘fee-paying schools’ intervention

Evaluating the Office of Fair Trading’s ‘fee-paying schools’ intervention

Horizontal exchange of information - institutional impact on entrepreneurial activity

Endogenous Lysine Strategy Profile and Cartel Duration: An Instrumental Variables Approach

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About