The law of small numbers: investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

Chever, Lisa; Saussier, Stéphane

doi:10.1080/00036846.2017.1279270

Cited by 23 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…They find evidence that negotiations correlate with lower consumer surplus, increasing prices for similar services. Chever and Moore (2012) and Chever et al (2013) reach a different conclusion studying construction of social housing in France. They find that negotiations after an informal auction are associated with lower costs relative to open auctions.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance

2018

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We run a regression discontinuity design analysis to document the causal effect of increasing buyers' discretion on procurement outcomes in a large database for public works in Italy. Works with a value above a given threshold have to be awarded through an open auction. Works below this threshold can be more easily awarded through a restricted auction, where the buyer has some discretion in terms of who (not) to invite to bid. Our main result is that discretion increases the probability that the same firm wins repeatedly, and it does not deteriorate (and may improve) the procurement outcomes we observe. The effects of discretion persist when we repeat the analysis controlling for the geographical location, corruption, social capital and judicial efficiency in the region of the public buyers running the auctions.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance

2018

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“…This result is robust when controlling for the geographical location, corruption, social capital, and judicial efficiency in the region of the public buyers that run the auctions. In the same vein, Chever et al (2017), with data on 180 calls for bids and contracts that were signed by a French local public buyer of social housing, found that limiting competition (i.e., restraining the number of responses to the call for bids) for small simple projects enables economies to be made on transaction costs without increasing procurement costs, corruption and favoritism.…”

Section: Box 5: Privatization and Mortalitymentioning

confidence: 97%

Public Versus Private Management in Water Public Services: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead

Porchet

Saussier²

2018

SSRN Journal

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Governments have largely turned to public-private partnerships (PPPs) to manage public services. Although it is difficult to analyze PPPs as discrete and alternative forms of public service organization, they all constitute some forms of partial outsourcing of activities that contribute to the realization of a public service. In water industries, the most common form of PPPs is the concession, in which a private firm finances and operates the public service of water while the infrastructure remains public. This report seeks to answer the question of whether PPPs have contributed successfully to the quality and improvement of water public services all around the world. The paper is organized in three sections. In the first section, the different supposed advantages and costs of PPPs are presented. The second section reviews some of the most important studies on the efficiency of PPPs in water industries. The last section provides some recommendations to improve the use of PPPs in water public services.

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“…In the same vein, Chever et al. (), using data on 180 call for bids and contracts signed by a French local public buyer of social housing, found that limiting competition (i.e. restraining the number of responses to call for bids) for small simple projects enables economies to be made on transaction costs without increasing procurement costs or corruption and favouritism.…”

Section: Factors Influencing the Likelihood Of Performance Failure Inmentioning

confidence: 98%

Public Private Partnerships in Europe for Building and Managing Public Infrastructures: An Economic Perspective

Iossa

Saussier²

2018

Ann Public Coop Econ

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Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are long‐term contractual agreements between the public and private sector for the provision of public infrastructures and services. Due to tighter budget constraints and to a renewed interest in greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services, PPPs are likely to grow in the near future. In this paper, we review the theory and practice of PPPs, highlighting their potential role as well as discussing the main factors influencing the likelihood of performance failure.

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The law of small numbers: investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

Abstract: International audienc

Cited by 23 publications

References 26 publications

The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance

The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance

Public Versus Private Management in Water Public Services: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead

Public Private Partnerships in Europe for Building and Managing Public Infrastructures: An Economic Perspective

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