The legacy of a fractured Eurozone: The Greek Dra(ch)ma

Hatgioannides, John; Karanassou, Marika; Sala, Héctor; Karanasos, Menelaos; Koutroumpis, Panagiotis

doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.04.019

Cited by 6 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…the fiscal situation (Pagoulatos, 2020), and/or situate Greece’s economic problems in the broader macro-economics of the EU/EA (e.g. Hatgioannides et al, 2018; Provopoulos, 2014). At the other end of the scale, the few studies of Greek banks during the Eurozone crisis zoom in on the micro, tackling single, typically technical, aspects of Greek banking (e.g.…”

Section: Contradiction and Change - Theoretical And Historical Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

From “combined-but-not-unified” to “integrated isolation” - Greek banking in Europe 2010–2015

Labrinidis

Lindo

2022

Competition & Change

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Between 2010 and 2015 Greek banks received capital injections as part of an EU-led rescue package that left the Greek state with large losses on their investments and a debt to repay; in the most acute moments of the crisis the European central bank twice forced the Bank of Greece to assume sole responsibility for any losses on lending to Greek banks, and; in 2015 Greek banks were subject to EU-mandated controls that restricted the transformation of Greek bank deposits into Euros in other forms. Why did European banking infrastructure leave the Greek state facing losses and liabilities alone, while still full members of the EU and Euro Area (EA)? We find that European banking infrastructure is combined-but-not-unified, and that integration requires both. Drawing on Marxist political economy we examine the financial mechanisms in detail and find a scalar split in state provision of banking infrastructure in the EU/EA. At the supranational level, the removal of barriers to cross-border banking and a common rule book. Meanwhile, promises of monetary support, such as deposit guarantees and lending of last resort have largely remained the responsibility of nation states. The combined-but-not-unified structure ensured that when crisis struck, Greece was isolated, yet still fully part of the EU/EA.

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Section: Contradiction and Change - Theoretical And Historical Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

From “combined-but-not-unified” to “integrated isolation” - Greek banking in Europe 2010–2015

Labrinidis

Lindo

2022

Competition & Change

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“…Hatgioannides et al ( 2018 ) assessed the composition of the soaring Greek debt and the utilisation of the EU-IMF loans for the 2010–15 period. They provided novel evidence that the majority of the loans went overwhelmingly not to the benefit of a ‘profligate state’ but rather to avoid the write-downs of bad loans made by German and French banks to the Greek government and Hellenic private banks.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Greece 2010–18: What Could Have Been Done Differently?

2022

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At the beginning of 2010, the fiscal situation of Greece was unsustainable, and an ambitious but costly adjustment plan had to be put in place under a consortium of the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. It took three consecutive adjustment programmes, including debt-relief through private sector involvement, to restore confidence in the economy and achieve a budget surplus. In this paper, we provide a theoretical analysis of the Greek Crisis starting from 2010. We build a series of counterfactuals using the National Institute General Econometric Model (NIGEM) to analyse why the cost of the adjustment in terms of GDP loss and increase in debt-to-GDP ratio turned out to be much worse than expected. In doing so, we analyse three scenarios: (i) one in which we simulate a much more conservative cut in public investment by the Greek central government; (ii) a second scenario of a lower risk-premium, signalling, e.g., lower political and re-denomination risks, had the European Central Bank guaranteed its lending of last resort role earlier than 2012; (iii) finally, a similar financial envelope as the one adopted during the first Greek adjustment programme but over a longer period, moving beyond the standard IMF three-year duration programmes. We find that the mix of expenditure cuts and loss of confidence among households and firms explain a large part of the unanticipated costs of the adjustment in the Greek crisis.

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“…The increase in public debt produces destabilizing instability that determines the non-linearity of the convex interest that marks the euro area crisis. Research by Hatgioannides et al (2018) examined the composition of Greece's soaring debt and the troubling utilization of troika loans for the 2010-15 period. Hatgioannides et al (2018) found a neo-liberalism from the acute geoeconomic and social crisis that Greece has experienced since 2010 by releasing three consecutive bailout plans and implementing strict austerity policies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Research by Hatgioannides et al (2018) examined the composition of Greece's soaring debt and the troubling utilization of troika loans for the 2010-15 period. Hatgioannides et al (2018) found a neo-liberalism from the acute geoeconomic and social crisis that Greece has experienced since 2010 by releasing three consecutive bailout plans and implementing strict austerity policies. Hatgioannides et al (2018) prove that most of the loans do not benefit the Greek state.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Financial Crisis and Usury in Digital Economic

Prabowo

Sulisnaningrum

Harnani³

2021

JBFEM

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This paper investigates the inadequate evidence of usury in the economy in ASIA 5, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, China, and South Korea, to answer why major religions (Islam, Christianity, Judaism) prohibit usury. We use a qualitative research method of content analysis by collecting several justifiable evidence using source triangulation and method triangulation and combining with quantitative content analysis, which quantifies the qualitative findings and analyzes them quantitatively using Threshold Autoregressive. It is a proxy for forecasting future economic conditions considering each exchange rate regimes and the period of crisis experienced by the five countries. We found that the higher the riba proxied by the interest rate, the more burdening the five countries to recover from the crisis. Moreover, we find that the concept of sharia, which is proxied by direct investment, can boost the economy and can increase economic resilience against the financial crisis, which was evident in three countries, namely Thailand, Malaysia, and China, during the Asian crisis period (1997) to the digital economy era (2020).

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The legacy of a fractured Eurozone: The Greek Dra(ch)ma

Cited by 6 publications

References 9 publications

From “combined-but-not-unified” to “integrated isolation” - Greek banking in Europe 2010–2015

From “combined-but-not-unified” to “integrated isolation” - Greek banking in Europe 2010–2015

Greece 2010–18: What Could Have Been Done Differently?

Financial Crisis and Usury in Digital Economic

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