The lex Valeria and Sulla’s empowerment as dictator (82-79 BCE)

Vervaet, Frederik Juliaan

doi:10.3406/ccgg.2004.858

Cited by 11 publications

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“…infra n. 91. For the suggestion that the Valerian Law probably invested Sulla with (certain components of) the potestas censoria in his capacity of dictator, see Vervaet (2004) 47. 65 The wording in 1.118: ἀφικόμενος δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑπάτων δύο προσέλαβε suggests that Appian believed the consuls to have commanded one legion each.…”

Section: The State Of the Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crassus’ Command in the War against Spartacus (73–71 BCE): His Official Position, Forces and Political Spoils

Vervaet

2014

Klio

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Late in 72 BCE, Spartacus' stunning series of victories over the consuls L. Gellius Publicola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus and then the proconsul C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 73) triggered a dearth of candidates for the consular and praetorian elections for 71. This deadlock was broken only when M. Licinius Crassus announced that he would run for praetor, declaring he was prepared to accept the command against Spartacus. Immediately following his election, Crassus began preparing, probably receiving a grant of delegated praetorium imperium to bridge the interval between election and assumption of office. Having raised no less than six legions, personally advancing the funds required, he also took command of the two consular legions in the field. By means of this enormous army as well as his relentless efforts and strict discipline, he managed to put an end to this protracted and inglorious war in the span of six months. At some point in the summer or early autumn of 71, the equestrian proconsul Cn. Pompeius Magnus, back from Spain, decided he would settle for nothing less than another public triumph and the consulship itself. In order to secure these top prizes, he brazenly refused to disband his army, instead using it as leverage, just as he had already done in 81 and 77. Crassus, for his part, felt he could not fall behind, and entered into an unlikely if formidable alliance with his political rival. As both men ran on a strong po-

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Section: The State Of the Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crassus’ Command in the War against Spartacus (73–71 BCE): His Official Position, Forces and Political Spoils

Vervaet

2014

Klio

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“…51 Frederik Vervaet argues that the first interrex was perfectly qualified to preside over the assembly, but that it was not customary for him to do so because of religious scruples in maintaining optimal public auspices. 52 On the basis of the fact that the auspices could only be consulted by individual persons, Jerzy Linderski has suggested that the first interrex was actually selected by lot. The suggestion, if there were any evidence for the lots, would explain why it was only the second interrex who was appointed auspicato, or why his successors were qualified to convene the electoral assembly.…”

Section: From the Board Of Ten To Two Interregesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Five-Day Interregnum in the Roman Republic

Коптев

2016

The Class. Q.

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In the Roman Republic, in the case of the death of both consuls or a situation which made it impossible to proceed with the election of their successors, the Senate would decide to establish an interregnum. For that the senators chose several persons of patrician dignity from among their midst, and awarded them the auspices and the signs of magisterial power. The interreges had the task of preparing for the elections of new consuls and hold the electoral assembly. Although the interreges had been chosen by the Senate, rather than elected by the People, and were in power for a short period, they resembled extraordinary magistrates. The interrex was appointed by the senator with auspices; likewise, the magistrate was elected in accordance with the will of the gods (auspicato). As well as the auspices and the attributes of magisterial power (lictores, fasci, sella curulis), the interreges were provided with an ius agendi cum patribus et cum populo and could summon the People to the centuriate assembly. In an epistle to C. Trebatius Testa (Fam. 7.11.1), written in January 53 (all dates are b.c.), Cicero ironically said that, with such a large number of interreges, an experienced lawyer could use them to prepare a defence in civil suits by asking each interrex for two adjournments to obtain legal assistance. Interreges, albeit as part of a jest, were seen here as holders of some civil jurisdiction. Referring to Asconius' clarification that a certain M. Lepidus was appointed interrex because he had been elected as a curule magistrate, Theodor Mommsen concluded that every interrex was regarded as magistrate. In fact, Asconius means here that Lepidus held a curule magistracy in addition to his being interrex (or, more precisely, the magistracy entitled him to this role). Nevertheless, the notion of extraordinary magistrate has been frequently applied to the interrex by modern scholars. When interreges periodically appeared at the head of the Republic as holders of auspices and of the signs of the highest power for five days, the Romans became accustomed to thinking that the interreges received supremacy for that period.

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“…On placards: Östenberg, 2009c. 23 On Sulla and justification, see : Vervaet, 2004. On the triumvirs' use of Sulla as a model, see : Vervaet, 2004: esp.…”

Section: Pompeius's African and Spanish Triumphsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Triumph and civil war in the late Republic

Lange¹

2013

Pap. Br. Sch. Rome

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Many of the wars of the Late Republican period were largely civil conflicts, and there was thus a tension between the traditional expectation that triumphs should be celebrated for victories over foreign enemies and the need of the great commanders to give full expression to their prestige and charisma, and to legitimate their power. Most of the rules and conventions relating to triumphs thus appear to have been articulated as the development of Roman warfare brought new issues to the Senate's attention. This paper will examine these tensions and the ways in which they were resolved. The traditional war-ritual of the triumph and the topic of civil war have both received renewed interest in recent scholarship. However, attempts to define the relationship between them have been hampered by comments in the ancient evidence that suggest the celebration of a triumph for victory in a civil war was contrary to traditional practices. Nevertheless, as this paper will argue, a general could expect to triumph after a civil war victory if it could be represented also as over a foreign enemy (the civil war aspect of the victory did not have to be denied); only after a victory in an exclusively civil war was this understood to be in breach of traditional practices.Molte delle guerre del periodo tardo-repubblicano furono nella maggior parte dei casi conflitti civili, ed esiste pertanto una tensione tra l'aspettativa tradizionale secondo cui i trionfi avrebbero dovuto essere celebrati solo per le vittorie sui nemici stranieri e il bisogno dei grandi comandanti di fornire piena espressione al loro prestigio e carisma, e di legittimare il loro potere. Molte delle regole e delle convenzioni relative ai trionfi perciò appaiono essere stati articolati come se lo sviluppo della guerra romana portasse nuove questioni all'attenzione del Senato. Con questo articolo si esamineranno tali tensioni e i modi in cui furono risolte. Il tradizionale rituale militare del trionfo e il soggetto della guerra civile hanno entrambi ricevuto rinnovato interesse in recenti studi. Comunque, tentativi di definire la relazione tra loro sono stati ostacolati da commenti nelle fonti antiche secondo cui la celebrazione di un trionfo per la vittoria in una guerra civile era contraria alle pratiche tradizionali. Ciononostante, come si dedurrà in questo articolo, un generale poteva aspettarsi di trionfare dopo una vittoria in una guerra civile se questa poteva essere rappresentata anche come una vittoria su un nemico straniero (l'aspetto di guerra civile della vittoria non doveva essere negato); solo dopo una vittoria in una guerra meramente civile il trionfo sarebbe stato inteso come una rottura con le pratiche tradizionali.There has been a recent outpouring of research on the Roman triumph, 1 and much of this attention has focused on the rules and conventions for qualifying for a triumph. We are best informed about this topic by Livy's evidence for the late third and early second centuries, and as a result much of the discussion has dealt mainly with this per...

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The lex Valeria and Sulla’s empowerment as dictator (82-79 BCE)

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Crassus’ Command in the War against Spartacus (73–71 BCE): His Official Position, Forces and Political Spoils

Crassus’ Command in the War against Spartacus (73–71 BCE): His Official Position, Forces and Political Spoils

The Five-Day Interregnum in the Roman Republic

Triumph and civil war in the late Republic

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