The Life Cycle of Party Manifestos: The Austrian Case

Dolezal, Martin; Ennser‐Jedenastik, Laurenz; Müller, Wolfgang C.; Winkler, Anna Katharina

doi:10.1080/01402382.2012.682349

Cited by 75 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Although we can only measure voter salience after the election took place, we believe that the post-election issue agenda should be a good proxy for the pre-election period on which manifestos were based. This is because the time span between the publication of a party's manifesto and the election itself is usually short, often just a couple of weeks (Dolezal et al 2012), and the public issue agenda is rather stable over a single election campaign (Page 1978: chapter 5;Clarke et al 2009: chapter 3 and 152-6). 10.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Issues do Parties Emphasise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems

Wagner¹,

Meyer²

2014

West European Politics

194

150

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Issues do Parties Emphasise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems

Wagner¹,

Meyer²

2014

West European Politics

194

150

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“…Their dynamic nature allows parties to react to each other and thus to pursue issue engagement. Compared to manifestos, which also serve in part as signals to party activists (Dolezal et al 2012), the target readership of party press releases is clear, as they are written for the main purpose of influencing the public debate via the news media (Hopmann et al 2012). Party press releases also have advantages over other sources of salience measures.…”

Section: Measuring Issue Engagement In Party Press Releasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Issue Engagement in Election Campaigns The Impact of Electoral Incentives and Organizational Constraints

Meyer¹,

Wagner²

2015

PSRM

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It is easier for voters to make informed electoral choices when parties talk about the same issues. Yet parties may decide against such 'issue engagement'. We hypothesize that issue engagement between parties is more likely (a) when the similarity of their policy positions means that both parties have clear electoral incentives to talk about the same topics and (b) when parties face few organizational constraints in terms of campaign resources. Our empirical analysis of 2,453 press releases by Austrian parties shows that ideological proximity and party resources affect the level of issue engagement. These findings suggest that issue engagement is less likely precisely where it is needed most, which has important implications for understanding the democratic quality of election campaigns. Pre-print version of the accepted manuscript:Meyer, Thomas M., and Markus Wagner (2015). 'Issue engagement in election campaigns: the impact of electoral incentives and organizational constraints ', Political Science Research and Methods. FirstView.

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“…Zur Abschwächung der Gefahr dieses Steuerungsdefizits (agency loss), können Parteien Kontrollmechanismen verankern. Ein insbesondere für westeuropäische Demokratien typischer Kontrollmechanismus ist ein schriftliches, öffentlich zugängli-ches Koalitionsabkommen (Müller/Strøm 2000Strøm/Müller 1999) (Tsebelis 1995(Tsebelis , 2002 Kaum ein Ergebnis findet in der Literatur derart ungeteilte Unterstützung wie die Vorhersagekraft des aktuellen Policy-Zustands (Costello/Thomson 2008, 250;Kostadinova 2013, 12;Mansergh/Thomson 2007, 319;Royed 1996, 61-62;Schermann/Ennser-Jedenastik 2014, 577;Thomson et al 2010, 18;2012, 22;2014, 24 (Dolezal et al 2012;Jenny 2006, 884;Robertson 1976, 72;Rose 1980, 56). Wahlprogramme sind daher der beste Indikator für das Policy-Angebot einer Partei im Wahlkampf und bilden nicht umsonst die in der Literatur zur Umsetzung von Wahlversprechen typische Datengrundlage (Costello/Thomson 2008;Mansergh/Thomson 2007;Naurin 2011;Royed 1996;Thomson 2001;Thomson et al 2010; (Dolezal et al 2014, 9).…”

Section: Hypothesenunclassified

Die Policy-Bilanz der Regierung Faymann I. Ein Test der Mandatstheorie

Praprotnik¹

2015

ozp

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The policy-outcome of the cabinet Faymann I. A test of mandate theoryAbstract Indirect representation of the people lies at the very heart of representative democracy and is captured within the mandate theory. Mandate theory states that parties' pre-election behavior should predict their behavior in office. The present study conducts a test of mandate theory by analyzing pledge fulfilment in Austria during the 2008-13 legislative period. It presents a description of the then governing parties' policy outcomes (SPÖ, ÖVP) in comparison to the opposition parties' performance (FPÖ, BZÖ, Greens) based on 574 different pledges. The multivariate analyses show that factors such as governing status, coalition agreements, intra-coalition consensus, and status quo pledges significantly enhance parties' possibilities to fulfil their mandate.

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The Life Cycle of Party Manifestos: The Austrian Case

Cited by 75 publications

References 22 publications

Which Issues do Parties Emphasise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems

Which Issues do Parties Emphasise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems

Issue Engagement in Election Campaigns The Impact of Electoral Incentives and Organizational Constraints

Die Policy-Bilanz der Regierung Faymann I. Ein Test der Mandatstheorie

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