The Limits of Conscious Deception Detection: When Reliance on False Deception Cues Contributes to Inaccurate Judgments

Abstract

People are generally too trusting, which decreases their ability to detect deceit. This suggests that distrust could enhance our deception detection abilities. Yet, a state of distrust may induce deliberative conscious thought. This mode of thinking has been related to worse complex decision making. Hence, we investigate whether contextual distrust decreases the ability to detect deceit via the stronger reliance on consciously held beliefs about which cues betray deception. In two studies, participants were asked to judge videos of either deceiving or truth telling targets. Contextual distrust was manipulated by asking participants to squint their eyes (distrust) or to round their eyes (trust) while watching the videos. Participants' judgments of targets being deceptive or truthful were measured (Studies 1 and 2) and they were asked on what basis they made these judgments (Study 2). Results showed that distrust especially hampers the detection of truth, which is partly due to more reliance on false beliefs about deception cues. These results corroborate the idea that deliberative conscious information processing may hinder truth detection, while intuitive information processing may facilitate it.

Distrust, False Cues, and Below-Chance Deception Detection Accuracy: Commentary on Stel et al. (2020) and Further Reflections on (Un)Conscious Lie Detection From the Perspective of Truth-Default Theory

“…We found that warning people about the chances of deception reduced, but did not eliminate, truth-bias (McCornack and Levine, 1990; also see replication by Kim and Levine, 2011). Although Stel et al (2020) did not forewarn participants, conceptually forewarning should lead to distrust as Stel et al define it. My understanding of our 1990 findings changed a decade later when Hee Sun Park came up with the "veracity effect" (Levine et al, 1999). Suspicion/distrust decreases accuracy for truths, increases accuracy for lies, and the gains and losses average out overall (Kim and Levine, 2011).…”

“…Stel et al ( 2020 , p. 1) wrote: “distrust especially hampers the detection of truth, which is partly due to more reliance on false beliefs about deception cues. These results corroborate the idea that deliberative conscious information processing may hinder truth detection, while intuitive information processing may facilitate it” (see Street and Vadillo, 2016 for a discussion of unconscious and indirect lie detection).…”

“…We found that warning people about the chances of deception reduced, but did not eliminate, truth-bias (McCornack and Levine, 1990 ; also see replication by Kim and Levine, 2011 ). Although Stel et al ( 2020 ) did not forewarn participants, conceptually forewarning should lead to distrust as Stel et al define it.…”

“…Training participants to consciously look for wrong cues does not produce below chance accuracy (Levine et al, 2005). Stel et al (2020) explain their below-chance accuracy by increased reliance on false beliefs about deception cues. Their mechanism, however, cannot not explain their findings.…”

“…This essay has two distinct aims: commentary on Stel et al ( 2020 ) and addressing (Un)Conscious Lie Detection from the Perspective of Truth-Default Theory. Stel et al ( 2020 ) advance the counter-intuitive claim that distrust inhibits truth detection by prompting more deliberate reliance on false beliefs about deception cues. Their proposed mechanism lacks plausibility because cues are generally non- rather than anti-diagnostic.…”