The Limits of Control – (Governmental) Identity Management from a Privacy Perspective

Abstract

Abstract. The emergence of identity management indicates that the process of identification has reached a stage where analog and digital environments converge. This is also reflected in the increased efforts of governments to introduce electronic ID systems, aiming at security improvements of public services and unifying identification procedures to contribute to administrative efficiency. Though privacy is an obvious core issue, its role is rather implicit compared to security. Based on this premise, this paper discusses a control dilemma: the general aim of identity management to compensate for a loss of control over personal data to fight increasing security and privacy threats could ironically induce a further loss of control. Potential countermeasures demand user-controlled anonymity and pseudonymity as integral system components and imply further concepts which are in their early beginnings, e.g., limiting durability of personal data and transparency enhancements with regard to freedom of information to foster user control.

Electronic identity (eID) and electronic signature (eSig) for eGovernment services – a comparative legal study

“…Most eID systems create the unique identity of a person through the linkage to one or more unique numbers (unique identifiers, UI). Nearly all present eID concepts of EU member states involve generating a unique identification number or resorting to existing public registers with unique numbers (Strauß, 2011). Most European eIDMS utilize UIs derived from national registers (e.g.…”

“…Primary digital identifiers directly connected to a person include, e.g., name, address, mobile phone number, password or eSig (Graux et al, 2009). These identifiers are stored in an encrypted form or -as is the case in Belgium -directly stored on the eID device (Strauß, 2011).…”

Privacy Issues in Cross-Border Identity Management Systems: Pan-European Case

“…e personal identity data in the eID IdMs has been identif [4], [21]. Some of the reasons were identified during mechanisms used by the system lack transparency ging technologies the EU regulations get obsolete recognition catalyzes ubiquitous adoption of the e y creates a threat to privacy.…”

Introducing public sector eIDs: The power of actors’ translations and institutional barriers

“…Hence, the service personalisation we have seen in recent years in areas such as eGovernment digital services also requires the users to securely declare their identity (Corradini et al, 2006). As described, this need can, in turn, be traced back to being the equivalent of the traditional ways of identification in service relationships where the identity has to be securely established in order for correct and non-reputable service provision (Strauß, 2011). Guided by the notion of having an eID to cover a nation's entire population, an increasing number of countries have developed their own national eID solutions.…”

“…Anderson, 2006;Hedström et al, 2016;Hedström et al, 2015). Accordingly, both pressures are examples of increasing needs of declaring users identity in a secure way in digital services (Corradini et al, 2006) for non-reputable service provision (Strauß, 2011). The pressures and barriers to negotiate in these cases are therefore some of the new challenges introduced when eIDs are getting increasingly important in organizations (e.g.…”