The Limits of Deterrence Theory in Cyberspace

Abstract

In this article, I analyse deterrence theory and argue that its applicability to cyberspace is limited and that these limits are not trivial. They are the consequence of fundamental differences between deterrence theory and the nature of cyber conflicts and cyberspace. The goals of this analysis are to identify the limits of deterrence theory in cyberspace, clear the ground of inadequate approaches to cyber deterrence, and define the conceptual space for a domain-specific theory of cyber deterrence, still to be developed.

War, Health and Ecosystem: Generative Metaphors in Cybersecurity Governance

“…Problems with the regulatory model of war can be divided into conceptual and practical ones. The conceptual difficulties have been described in depth elsewhere (Rid 2012;Taddeo 2016Taddeo , 2017, and so they will be only briefly summarised here. The existing laws of war are built on the tenet of 'war as a last resort'.…”

“…This poses a problem as the conceptual framework of war relies on clearly defined state antagonists. Ambiguity around actors and motives involved in cyber attacks complicates the problems of attribution and proportionality (Taddeo 2017;Taddeo and Floridi 2018). Even in cases where an attack is traced to a particular national territory, the precise nature of a state's involvement-whether it coordinated, facilitated, or merely turned a blind eye to an attack by "patriotic hackers-often remains obscure.…”

Is Cybersecurity a Public Good?

“…Facilitating systems' responses may not improve security of cyberspace. Quite the contrary, it is likely to lead to intensification of cyber attacks, which, in turn, may lead to kinetic (physical) consequences and pose serious risks of escalation and physical security (Taddeo 2017a). In 2018 a number of US Senators proposed to allow companies to hack back-respond-to cyber attacks.…”

“…We should think of them as agile, flexible, but brittle systems. This brittleness, as I argued elsewhere (Taddeo 2016(Taddeo , 2017a, favours offence over defence, explaining in part the continue growth of cyber threats and the escalation of their impact. The more digital technologies become pervasive, the wider becomes the surface of attacks, and with it also number of successful attacks grows.…”

Regulate artificial intelligence to avert cyber arms race

“…for example, the United States has been evaluating the use of autonomous defence systems and is expected to issue a report on its strategy next month 3 . AI makes deterrence possible because attacks can be punished 4 . Algorithms can identify the source and neutralize it without having to identify the actor behind it.…”