2013
DOI: 10.1177/0095399712473999
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The Little Blue Pill That Killed the Little Pink House

Abstract: Community and business interests are set in opposition, rather than in a harmonious balance, in the 2005 landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. New London. The narrative of eminent domain, through the lens of Kelo, highlights these conflicting values. The case presents a local government that used its power of takings to attract Pfizer, the pharmaceutical conglomerate, to build a plant for production of the little blue pill, which symbolizes private interests in this case. The community's dissension o… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Such entities are often less open to public scrutiny than local legislatures, either because of specific legal exceptions or because their relative insulation from the electorate emboldens them to flout relevant requirements (Foster 1997; Friedland, Piven, and Alford 1977; Walsh 1978). Venue-shifting to quasi-public entities is evident in efforts to develop large-scale mixed-use revitalization projects and professional sports facilities, which may require both the exercise of eminent domain and the creation of special financing mechanisms (Sapotichne and Smith 2012; see also Lavine and Oder 2010; Olejarski and Farley 2015). Scholars should more clearly identify the circumstances under which venue-shifting among overlapping governmental and nongovernmental entities undermines accountability in urban and environmental planning processes.…”
Section: Assessing the Tensions Of Transparencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such entities are often less open to public scrutiny than local legislatures, either because of specific legal exceptions or because their relative insulation from the electorate emboldens them to flout relevant requirements (Foster 1997; Friedland, Piven, and Alford 1977; Walsh 1978). Venue-shifting to quasi-public entities is evident in efforts to develop large-scale mixed-use revitalization projects and professional sports facilities, which may require both the exercise of eminent domain and the creation of special financing mechanisms (Sapotichne and Smith 2012; see also Lavine and Oder 2010; Olejarski and Farley 2015). Scholars should more clearly identify the circumstances under which venue-shifting among overlapping governmental and nongovernmental entities undermines accountability in urban and environmental planning processes.…”
Section: Assessing the Tensions Of Transparencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(For a fuller review of Administrative Discretion in Action , see Caiden, 2014. For more commentary on the case, see Olejarski & Farley, 2015. )…”
Section: A Case For Administrative Law: Administrative Discretion In mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In their seminal work on implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) remind us that missing this disconnect is fatal to the process; excessive media attention on governmental takings abuses tells us they were right because of the strong anti-eminent domain sentiment. Practitioners on the frontlines of takings have an opportunity to build goodwill within the community, beyond only holding required public hearings (deLeon & deLeon, 2002; Olejarski & Farley, 2015).…”
Section: Implications For Research and Practicementioning
confidence: 99%