The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Howarth, Stephanie; Handley, Simon J.; Walsh, Clare R.

doi:10.1080/13546783.2018.1523808

Cited by 13 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…This account claims that, depending on the complexity of the task at hand, T1 processes have access to the underlying logical structure of the problem and interestingly, on simple reasoning problems, the logical structure of a statement is more accessible than other features like its believability . The fast logic hypothesis of this model is consistent with the observation of higher accuracy and lower speed for logic judgments (Handley et al, 2011;Pennycook, Trippas, et al, 2014) and the relative immunity of logic judgments from cognitive loading compared to belief judgments Howarth et al, 2018).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

Ghasemi¹,

Handley²,

Howarth³

2020

Preprint

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Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiment 1 and 4), likeability (Experiment 1, 2, and 3) and brightness (Experiment 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments. However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

Ghasemi¹,

Handley²,

Howarth³

2020

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…The main goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether conflict interferes with belief judgments on both logical and pseudo-logical arguments. Consistent with numerous findings in the literature, we found that a conflict between the logical validity and believability of a conclusion affected both accuracy and confidence ratings under both belief and logic instructions (Handley et al, 2011;Howarth et al, 2018;Ricco et al, 2020;Thompson et al, 2018;Trippas et al, 2017): Participants were less accurate and less confident on conflict arguments than non-conflict arguments. Under belief instructions, this sensitivity to conflict has been considered to be evidence for logical intuition (Handley & Trippas, 2015;Trippas & Handley, 2018).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 89%

“…However, belief interfered with logic judgments to the same extent for both cognitive ability groups. Consistent with Experiment 2, this finding supports the notion that individual differences in logical intuition cannot be explained by variation in cognitive ability (Ghasemi et al, 2021;Howarth et al, 2018;Markovits et al, 2020;Morsanyi & Handley, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

“…The goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and to investigate the relationship between our pseudo-logical conflict effects and cognitive ability. Contrary to expectations, it has been observed that logical intuitions are most likely to be observed amongst high-rather than low-ability reasoners (Erceg et al, 2019;Frey et al, 2017;Hayes et al, 2020;Raoelison et al, 2020;Šrol & De Neys, 2020;Thompson et al, 2018;Thompson & Johnson, 2014; but see, Ghasemi et al, 2021;Howarth et al, 2018;Markovits et al, 2020;Nakamura & Kawaguchi, 2016). The explanation given for this relationship is that high ability reasoners have learned (at least simple) logical inferences to the point of automaticity (Stanovich, 2018;Thompson et al, 2018), so that they interfere with the ability to make belief-based judgement.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 64%

“…These results strongly suggest that individual differences in logical intuitions are positively correlated with cognitive capacities. However, studies that have examined logical intuitions by manipulating instructions (e.g., asking reasoners whether they like conclusions), have not consistently observed that the validity effect on liking judgements was related to cognitive abilities (Ghasemi et al, 2021;Howarth et al, 2018;Nakamura & Kawaguchi, 2016).…”

Section: Individual Differences In Logical Intuitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Logical Intuition Is Not Really About Logic

Ghasemi¹,

Handley²,

Howarth³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Recent research suggest that reasoners are able to draw simple logical or probabilistic inferences relatively intuitively and automatically, a capacity which has been termed “logical intuition” (see, for example, De Neys & Pennycook, 2019). A key finding in support of this interpretation is that conclusion validity consistently interferes with judgments of conclusion believability, suggesting that information about logical validity is available quickly enough to interfere with belief judgments. In this paper we examined whether logical intuitions arise because reasoners are sensitive to the logical features of problem or another structural feature that just happens to aligns with logical validity. In three experiments (N = 113, 137, and 122), we presented participants with logical (determinate) and pseudo-logical (indeterminate) arguments and asked them to judge the validity or believability of the conclusion. Logical arguments had determinately valid or invalid conclusions, whereas pseudo-logical arguments were all logically indeterminate, but some were pseudo-valid (possible ‘strong’ arguments) and others pseudo-invalid (possible ‘weak’ arguments). Experiments 1 and 2 used simple Modus Ponens and Affirming the Consequent structures; Experiment 3 used more complex Denying the Antecedent and Modus Tollens structures. In all three experiments, we found that pseudo-validity interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as real validity. Altogether, these findings suggest that whilst people are able to draw inferences intuitively, and these inferences impact on belief judgments, they are not ‘logical intuitions.’ Rather, the intuitive inferences are driven by the processing of more superficial structural features that happen to align with logical validity.

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Analysis and Intuition Effectiveness in Moral Problems

Julmi

2023

J Bus Ethics

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There has been a longstanding controversy in research as to whether moral judgment is the result of an analytical or an intuitive process. Today, researchers increasingly recognize that moral judgments can be the result of both intuition and analysis, and that the two paths can lead to different results. This raises the question as to which of the two processes leads to a better moral judgment. The article develops a typology of moral problems depending on their moral uncertainty and moral equivocality and links the derived types with analysis and intuition effectiveness. The typology considers four types of moral problems: compliance problems (low uncertainty, low equivocality), professional ethics problems (high uncertainty, low equivocality), conformity problems (low uncertainty, high equivocality) and ethical dilemmas (high uncertainty, high equivocality). The article argues that compliance and professional ethics problems are best solved analytically, whereas intuition is assumed to be more suitable for conformity problems and ethical dilemmas. Moreover, the article shows that it is not sufficient to contrast intuition with analysis alone. The higher the moral uncertainty, the more important the interplay of intuition and analysis becomes in making moral judgments.

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The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Cited by 13 publications

References 41 publications

The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

Logical Intuition Is Not Really About Logic

Analysis and Intuition Effectiveness in Moral Problems

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