The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns in the Middle East, 1914–22

Civilian Specialists at War

“…However, although the inspector-general of fortifications, Sir John Fox Burgoyne, affirmed in evidence to a royal commission that 'the whole safety of the kingdom' depended upon the nation's ability to concentrate men swiftly -and his stance was bolstered by Wellington's endorsement -the government declined to act. 13 At the opposite end of the country, Lord Fisher's decision to move the Grand Fleet to Scapa Flow in the 1910s was taken without consideration of the railway requirements of a modern navy. While Moltke the elder implored his countrymen to build railways rather than fortresses, '[n]othing whatever was done by the State to improve the land approaches to Scapa Flow' in the decade before the First World War.…”

“…Whereas the Volunteers of the Napoleonic Wars had no option but to march across country, the British railway network of the 1860s comprised thousands of miles of track upon which men, horses and equipment could be moved to any point of danger. 27 However, that track was owned and operated by a byzantine configuration of large and small companies, many with their own locomotives and rolling stock, rather than a single corporate entity. In anticipation of the complications likely to be encountered in the event that a large-scale movement of the Volunteers was required, the ICE's honorary secretary, Sir Charles Manby, wrote to the institution's council on 2 July 1860 to suggest the formation of a 'Volunteer Engineering Staff Corps for the Arrangement of the Transport of Troops and Stores, the Construction of defensive works and the destruction of other works, in case of Invasion'.…”

“…12 The duties assigned to the directorate included the collection of information about the military capabilities of the British empire, the collation of intelligence on Britain's possible opponents in a future war, and the preparation of mobilization schemes to meet potential threats. 13 Therefore, upon his appointment to the role of DMO, Wilson became intrinsically connected with two tasks: ensuring that Britain's political and military leaders knew the identity and strength of Britain's most likely adversaries; and preparing the army to respond to external dangers effectively.…”

“…In doing so, Proctor's work joins a corpus of literature that has considered the technical and moral implications of the mobilization of scientific knowledge during the conflict. 13 This book seeks to draw business knowledge and managerial acumen into the same discussions. In an era before the establishment of private military contractors able to provide states with what Marc Lindemann has referred to as 'expertise at a price', 14 during the First World War civilians were deeply embedded in the war machine and performed tasks both directly and indirectly related to their peacetime specializations.…”

“…In 1986 Donald Coleman and Christine MacLeod unearthed 'a mountain of apparently damning evidence' as to the 'incompetence … ignorance, indifference, hostility [to new technology], prejudice and complacency' of British businessmen in the century after 1850. 27 Both at the time and in the historical analysis of the period that followed, the industrial elite in turnof-the-century Britain have been largely denigrated in comparison to their counterparts in advanced nations such as the United States and Germany. American methods and processes in industries as diverse as railways, shoe 23 Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 104.…”