The London New Issue Market

Paish, F. W.

doi:10.2307/2601575

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…For sources, see for example,Cairncross (1958 and1953),Code Holland and Werry (1932),Davies (1979), Franks, Mayer andRenneboog (2001),Michie (1999),Morgan and Thomas (1962),Paish (1951), SargantFlorence (1947) andSchwabe and Branson (1913). 10 Inevitably, LLSV's measure is incomplete as a scorecard of investor rights.…”

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confidence: 99%

Ownership: Evolution and Regulation

2006

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confidence: 99%

Ownership: Evolution and Regulation

2006

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“…The firm's owners (known as the 'vendors') would typically install several of their members as the initial directors. Nye (2014) p. 215 states that: 'before the Great War, firms were formed and floated by individual entrepreneurs and not by banks' (see also Paish (1951), Harrison (1981), Armstrong (1986), and Chambers and Dimson (2009)). The lawyers aided the firm to draft the prospectus, which comprised a section of financial information certified by the auditors.…”

Section: Institutional Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…British firms were rapidly going public (see Armstrong (1986Armstrong ( , 1990, Franks, Meyer and Rossi (2009), and Hannah (1983)) with IPOs the chosen method of more than 90% of such firms (see Paish (1951)). There was also a growing investor base as the percentage of the population classed as investors rose from 0.8% in 1870 to 2.2% by 1914 (see Michie (2004) p. 72).…”

Section: Institutional Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

British IPO directors, 1891–1911

2019

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Company directors in Victorian Britain have a somewhat dubious reputation. There are claims that directors had little business experience with the directorships obtained mainly via social connections. However, a little experience goes a long way, and boards with experienced directors can place their securities in an initial public offering (IPO) at better prices and can obtain more dispersed ownership than inexperienced boards. We find evidence of network effects-directors attracted investors from firms they had previously floated. These beneficial effects of experience are appreciated by the market; experienced directors are more likely to obtain future positions on IPO boards.

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“…Kennedy, Industrial structure . See also Paish, ‘New issue market’; Crafts, ‘Victorian Britain’; Cottrell, Industrial finance ; Pollard, ‘Capital exports’; O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and history , ch. 11.…”

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confidence: 99%

An efficient market? Going public in London, 1891–1911

Fjesme

Galpin

Moore

2018

The Economic History Review

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There have been claims that British capital was not well deployed in Victorian Britain. There was, allegedly, a lack of support for new and dynamic companies in comparison to the situation in Germany and the US. We find no evidence to support these claims. The London Stock Exchange welcomed young, old, domestic, and foreign firms. It provided funds to firms in old, existing industries as well as patenting firms in ‘new‐tech’ industries at similar costs of capital. If investors did show a preference for older and foreign firms, it was because those firms offered investors better long‐run performance. In addition, we show some evidence that investors who worked in the same industry and lived close to the firm going public were allotted more shares in high‐quality initial public offerings.

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The London New Issue Market

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Ownership: Evolution and Regulation

Ownership: Evolution and Regulation

British IPO directors, 1891–1911

An efficient market? Going public in London, 1891–1911

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