The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the neo-realist research programme

Abstract

With the Treaty on European Union, or the Maastricht Treaty, into force in November 1993, the member-states of the European Community (EC) appeared to be embarking on a far-reaching enterprise to enhance the authority of Community institutions. Continuing a process that had begun with the Single European Act (SEA), into force in 1987, Maastricht increased the powers of the European Parliament. It established mechanisms whereby EC countries were to seek to improve policy coordination in such diverse areas as social affairs, high technology, border controls, immigration, and anti-crime efforts. It committed the EC members to work toward the establishment of a common foreign and security policy. Most importantly, it laid out a path and timetable for qualified EC members to achieve Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by the end of the 1990s.

De Brasília À Caracas: Cooperação Brasileira Para Contenção Venezuelana

“…Por consequência, os esforços se traduzem na criação de práticas regionais que limitam o escopo do processo político e evitam que atitudes bem como práticas ameaçadoras ao projeto regional brasileiro venham à tona (Gruber, 2005, p. 102-104 Contudo, a opção venezuelana de integrar os arranjos regionais pode ser entendida tanto como parte de seu projeto regional de liderança, exercendo influência em outros atores, como também uma forma de racionalizar o exercício do seu poder (Serbin, 2009 Mas além disso, também podemos entender tal inserção através do argumento de Grieco de que as instituições podem ser entendidas como plataformas de projeção de poder e racionalização do mesmo (Grieco, 1996).…”

The Stability and Growth Pact - Theorizing a Case in European Integration*

“…Drawing on intergovernmentalist and realist analyses of EMU (Garrett, 1994;Grieco, 1995;Moravcsik, 1998), one can identify Germany and France as the two most important actors who dominated the negotiations and on occasion even determined the crucial features of the outcome between themselves.…”

Rethinking European Union foreign policy

“…19 See, among others, Waltz (1979) Grieco (1988Grieco ( , 1990Grieco ( , 1993 and Mearsheimer (1990Mearsheimer ( , 1995. There have recently been signs that neo-realists may be relaxing this assumption by incorporating the role of international institutions into their otherwise exclusively structural theoretical framework; see, in particular, Grieco (1995Grieco ( , 1996. 20 See, for instance, Keohane (1984Keohane ( , 1986aKeohane ( , 1986bKeohane ( , 1989aKeohane ( , 1989bKeohane ( , 1990Keohane ( , 1993aKeohane ( , 1993bKeohane ( , 1993c, Keohane and Hoffmann (1993), or Keohane and Martin (1995).…”