The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.Abstract: There is uncertainty as to whether collective wage bargaining impedes the implementation of variable pay systems or not. We argue that much of this uncertainty is due to neglect of differences in the institutional structure of bargaining. Using representative company level data for all member states of the European Union, we investigate the incidence of variable pay systems in general as well as different types including payment-by-results, performance-related pay, and team-related pay under different bargaining arrangements. We find that the institutional structure of collective bargaining matters: variable pay systems thrive under company and multi-level collective bargaining, while their implementation is hindered under national-level collective wage bargaining.Freeman, Richard B. 1982. Union wage practices and wage dispersion within establishments.