THE MANY MORAL REALISMS<sup>1</sup>

Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01593.x

Cited by 66 publications

(38 citation statements)

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Section: Metaethics and Mental State Representationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, objective claims are mind-independent (e.g. "2 + 2 = 4" is true, regardless of what anyone believes; Goodwin & Darley, 2010;Sayre-McCord, 1986). It follows that subjective claims should evoke mental state representations, because mental state representations are necessary to evaluate the claim 1 .…”

Section: Metaethics and Mental State Representationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, moral subjectivists believe that personal beliefs govern whether moral claims are true-or that moral claims cannot be true or false at all (i.e. moral claims are akin to preferences; Sayre-McCord, 1986; for review, see Goodwin & Darley, 2010). Metaethical questions are the subject of intense philosophical debate, yet they are highly relevant to cognitive, social, and moral psychology.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, objective claims are mind-independent (e.g. "2 + 2 = 4" is true, regardless of what anyone believes; Goodwin & Darley, 2010;Sayre-McCord, 1986 What this all means for moral claims, is that if morals are represented as subjective, then they should elicit greater activity in brain regions responsible for mental state representation.This hypothesis is made testable by recent work in social neuroscience: a set of brain regionsthe Theory of Mind (ToM) network-has been consistently implicated in mental state representation (Amodio & Frith, 2006;Decety & Cacioppo, 2012;Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003;Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010;Young & Saxe, 2009; for reviews see Schurz et al, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). Within this network, some regions of interest (ROIs) are more active during tasks that involve general forms of social cognition, such as trait inference, or assessing the similarity of others to the self (dorsal/ventral-medial prefrontal cortex; DMPFC, VMPFC; Amodio & Frith, 2006;Decety & Cacioppo, 2012;Harris, Todorov, & Fiske, 2005; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010;Ma, Vandekerckhove, Van Hoeck, & Van Overwalle, 2012;Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005;Ochsner et al, 2005;Schurz et al, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009;Young & Saxe, 2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.

Theriault¹,

Waytz²,

Heiphetz³

et al. 2017

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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OVERLAP IN MORALS, FACTS, AND PREFERENCES 2Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral claims.Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the Theory of Mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common.Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships.Keywords: metaethics, morality, social cognition, fMRI, theory of mind OVERLAP IN MORALS, FACTS, AND PREFERENCES 3Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.Moral claims (e.g. "eating meat is wrong") can be evaluated on multiple levels. One may agree or disagree with a given claim (a first-order judgment); however, independent of this, one may make a second-order (i.e. metaethical) judgment-regardless of whether you agree or disagree, what information does the claim express? Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are either true or false, and that this truthfulness is independent of anyone's personal beliefs (i.e. moral claims are akin to facts). By contrast, moral subjectivists believe that personal beliefs govern whether moral claims are true-or that moral claims cannot be true or false at all (i.e. moral claims are akin to preferences; Sayre-McCord, 1986; for review, see Goodwin & Darley, 2010). Metaethical questions are the subject of intense philosophical debate, yet they are highly relevant to cognitive, social, and moral psychology. Metaethical questions ask how moral information is represented. It is possible that morals are represented...

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Section: Metaethics and Mental State Representationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Metaethics and Mental State Representationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.

Theriault¹,

Waytz²,

Heiphetz³

et al. 2017

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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“…Closer to the current context, recent workfare initiatives simply could not be justified with the same moral arguments put forward in the nineteenth century to support similar policies (King, 1999: 256). Like science, moral language can be seen as a genuine cognitive discourse, which advances over time (Sayre-McCord, 1986;Gilbert, 1990: 7-11 and 111-16).…”

Section: Democratic Deliberation As a Political Activitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic Deliberation in a Multinational Federation

Noël

2006

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

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Democratic deliberation is an aspiration that, in the mostThe concept of disinterested discussion is undoubtedly relevant and fruitful from a general philosophical standpoint, but it only corresponds in politics to a limit or extreme situation. To try and make it a central category in the analysis of representative government would be treat human beings as if they were angels.Bernard Manin, Principes du gouvernement représentatif (1996: 255; author's translation) Democratic deliberation is an aspiration that, in the most favorable conditions, remains difficult to achieve. Ideally, a shared public sphere must exist, and it should make possible a minimum of authentic communication over important collective values and objectives. In divided or multinational societies, these requirements appear particularly daunting. For one thing, there may not be much of a common public sphere, or the public sphere may not offer equal access to all groups and identities. Further, the prevailing standards for acceptable reasons and arguments may not be the same for all (Chambers, 2003: 321-22).In a recent article, John Dryzek identifies two possible responses to the difficulties posed by divided societies, and proposes a third approach of his own (2005). The first response, which he calls 'agonism,' stresses the irreducible character of differences over identity, and favors engagement and contestation over conciliation, accommodation, and joint decisions. This solution may be respectful of diversity, but it does not appear very conducive to truly shared democratic practices. At the opposite end, a second response, which Dryzek associates with the idea of consociationalism and presents as 'analgesia,' suggests to put aside divisive issues, avoid direct deliberation among constituents, and simply trust elite bargaining. In both instances, the problem of divided societies is solved by avoiding rather than by allowing genuine democratic deliberation over common purposes. Unsatisfied with these responses, Dryzek proposes his own approach, which favors a careful but circumscribed engagement of citizens through 2 issue-specific networks, with a focus on concrete needs rather than on more ambitious questions of identity, shared and divergent values, and constitutional arrangements.Canada, the author argues, offers a good example. Or, more precisely, Canada does so when it is not engaged in constitutional debates, which tend to end up in "deadlock, frustration, and failure " (2005: 235). It is indeed after constitutional failures, when it shifts to inaction, that Canada seems to Dryzek "at its best, because individuals on the various sides can then get back to engaging one another in the public sphere where struggle over sovereignty is not at stake. Political leadership can get back to the modus vivendi that makes Canada such a generally successful society. The peace is disturbed only by political philosophers who believe a constitutional solution is required" (2005: 235-36).Compared to the consociational, 'analgesic' response, Dryzek's ...

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