2007
DOI: 10.1080/10357710701358337
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The Maoist conflict in Nepal: a Himalayan perdition?

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Cited by 5 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Exclusion, geographical constrains and ethnic disparity were the basis for the Maoist rebellion in Nepal (Acharya, 2009;Cottle & Keys, 2007). Similarly, communist ideology promising 'greater social inclusion' provided more room for accelerating the insurgency through indoctrinating people.…”
Section: The Nexus Between Violence and Political Parties In Nepalmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Exclusion, geographical constrains and ethnic disparity were the basis for the Maoist rebellion in Nepal (Acharya, 2009;Cottle & Keys, 2007). Similarly, communist ideology promising 'greater social inclusion' provided more room for accelerating the insurgency through indoctrinating people.…”
Section: The Nexus Between Violence and Political Parties In Nepalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Youthquake is something the Oxford dictionary defines as 'a significant cultural, political, or social change arising from the actions or influence of young people'. One examples of Youthquake as a phenomenon is the Maoists rebellion that happened in Nepal where a majority of the insurgents were youth (Acharya, 2009;Cottle & Keys, 2007;Hutt, 2004;Saferworld, 2010;Shakya, 2011;Uprety, 2010). Youths sacrificed their lives for the transformation of the political system in Nepal.…”
Section: Youth Identity and Political Violencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thinking that the police action against the Maoists would be enough, King Birendra chose not to deploy the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) against the Maoists. Instead, more police were sent into rural areas, despite the fact that police were one of the main targets of the Maoists (Cottle and Keys 2007: 172). The Nepali government attempted to negotiate with the Maoists from time to time through mediators like Padma Ratna Tuladhar, Rishikesh Shah, Jaya Anand, Birendra Kesharia Pokharel, and Bishwakant Mainiali, but ended without any success.…”
Section: A Brief Note On Nepalese State’s Response During the Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, under pressure from all corners including political parties, the Maoists and the civil society, King Gyanendra reinstated government in April 2006. The government entered negotiations with the Maoists which culminated in the ceasefire agreement that was concluded on June 16, 2006 (Cottle and Keys 2007: 174). Subsequently, the negotiations between the SPA and the Maoists reached to the formulation of an eight-point agreement.…”
Section: Post Jana Andolan—2006 Situation and The Cpn (Maoist)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, one could argue that the Indian government was probably more concerned about a possible spillover effects of a Maoist takeover in Nepal on the Naxalite insurgencies in its own country than about a possible end of the democratic movement in the mountain kingdom (Cottle andKeys, 2007, p. 173, Malone 2011, p. 117). Instead, India has been willing to support the traditional two-pillar structure of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy, which characterized the Nepal's political system for a long time as long as this guaranteed the continued exclusion of Maoists from the political process.…”
Section: Regional Powers and Their Embeddedness In The International mentioning
confidence: 99%