The Market for Corporate Control (including Takeovers)

Bittlingmayer, George

doi:10.2139/ssrn.81808

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 349 publications

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“…As managers compete in the product market, assets (companies) go to the highest value use and thus inefficient managers are disciplined. However, the market for corporate control may be double-edged in that it also provides a means by which inefficient managers may indulge in empire building through ill-advised acquisitions (Bittlingmayer, 2000). (Bittlingmayer (2000), Bruner (2004), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), and Weston et al (2004) provide more detailed discussions on the market for corporate control.…”

Section: The Market For Corporate Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview

Gillan

2006

Journal of Corporate Finance

626

336

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Section: The Market For Corporate Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview

Gillan

2006

Journal of Corporate Finance

626

336

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…1, adapted from Sloan (2001), describes the role of both the accounting information and the participants in the corporate governance mechanisms 5 Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) find little evidence of underperformance for acquired companies, even for sub-samples of takeovers where managers are more likely to be disciplined. Bittlingmayer (1998) shows that if managers of the acquiring firms act on behalf of their shareholders, investors gain the highest value, but if managers serve their own interests rather than those of shareholders, the market for corporate control determines the means by which managers may be disciplined or replaced. 6 Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue that internal corporate governance mechanisms of incentive-based compensation and activist boards of directors and shareholders are playing an increasing role in mergers and acquisitions.…”

Section: Motivation Literature Review and Incremental Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using financial accounting information in the governance of takeovers: An analysis by type of acquirer

Aharony

Barniv

2004

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

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“…Here, the market for corporate control' serves as the external corporate governance mechanism par excellence to ensure the protection of shareholder interests, by aligning managerial strategies with the latter (Jensen 1993). It is a market in which control over a corporation (in the sense of a majority of vote-carrying securities) can be bought through a variety of methods, ranging from open market purchases to negotiated share swaps (Bittlingmayer 1998). Analytically a distinction can be made between capital markets and markets for corporate control (Höpner 2003b: 104 ff).…”

Section: Marketization As a Political Projectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance Regulation in the European Union – From Harmonization to Marketization

Horn

2012

Regulating Corporate Governance in the EU

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In the last couple of years, a broad range of regulatory initiatives with regard to company law and corporate governance has been taken by the Commission. These efforts, we shall argue, mark both a continuation-with respect to some of the issues involved-and a fundamental break-regarding both form and content-with earlier attempts at company law harmonization within the European Community. This transformation of corporate governance regulation at EU-level may be seen as a reflection and at the same time as an important cause of a broader, transnational transformation of corporate governance regulation in the European political economy. This paper argues that the EU has not only increased its attention to corporate governance regulation, but that, in terms of its content, the European approach to regulating the governance of corporations has shifted from a focus on harmonization, aimed at the prevention of regulatory competition, to a focus on promoting the marketization of corporate control, in part making use of market-based regulatory mechanisms. This shift cannot be simply explained either as a result of exogenous globalization pressures or as response to the recent wave of corporate scandals, but has to be interpreted as bound up with a coherent transnational political project constructed from the late 1980s onwards. This project can be understood both more broadly as a neoliberal project aimed at the marketization of the European socioeconomic order in general-that is, promoting the market mechanism as the organizing principle (Polanyi 1957) of this order-and more narrowly, as a project aimed at the marketization of corporate control. As this papers argues, the latter has been increasingly articulated with, and made an integral part of, Europe's strategy for creating a single financial market. The Transformation of Corporate Governance Regulation in the European Union: From Harmonization to Marketization The virtual unification of national company laws in all essential aspects […] is a deliberate act of policy on the part of the Community. In fact, it is a political act necessitated by the desire to accomplish the aims of the Community

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The Market for Corporate Control (including Takeovers)

Cited by 12 publications

References 349 publications

Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview

Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview

Using financial accounting information in the governance of takeovers: An analysis by type of acquirer

Corporate Governance Regulation in the European Union – From Harmonization to Marketization

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