2011
DOI: 10.4169/math.mag.84.4.268
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The Mathematics of Referendum Elections and Separable Preferences

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…In social choice theory, these total orders are called completely separable preferences [18,6]. In this setting, de Finetti's condition ensures that a voter's preference for the outcomes on a subset S ⊂ [n] of proposals is independent of the outcome of the proposals in S. Hodge and TerHaar [20] showed that the number of de Finetti total orders satisfies n!•|F n | = o(L(B n )).…”
Section: De Finetti Total Ordersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In social choice theory, these total orders are called completely separable preferences [18,6]. In this setting, de Finetti's condition ensures that a voter's preference for the outcomes on a subset S ⊂ [n] of proposals is independent of the outcome of the proposals in S. Hodge and TerHaar [20] showed that the number of de Finetti total orders satisfies n!•|F n | = o(L(B n )).…”
Section: De Finetti Total Ordersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…where ρ(B) is the rank of siblink B ∈ L 3 in the ordering of P([n]). We obtain v C 3 ∈ R 2 9 by adding expressions ( 9) and (10). We can routinely check that char(v C 3 ) = C 3 , though this is best done via mathematical software.…”
Section: P([n]mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Meanwhile, understanding the implications of preference interdependencies is critical in social choice theory [15,10]. Interrelated preferences can result in problematic outcomes for referendum elections.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In social choice theory, these orderings are called completely separable preferences [17,5]. In this setting, de Finetti's condition ensures that a voter's preference for the outcomes on a subset S ⊂ [n] of proposals is independent of the outcome of the proposals in S. Hodge and TerHaar [19] showed that the number of de Finetti extensions satisfies n!…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%