The measure of existence of a quantum world and the Sleeping Beauty Problem

Groisman, Berry; Hallakoun, Na’ama; Vaidman, Lev

doi:10.1093/analys/ant072

Cited by 20 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…In fact, Groisman reasons in accordance with ( ) in later writings (see e.g Groisman, Hallakoun, Vaidman [2013]…”

supporting

confidence: 59%

Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution

Luna¹

2020

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1/3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still believe the probability that the coin landed heads in the Sunday toss to be 1/2. The problem is that she is in a heads-awakening if and only if the coin landed heads. So, how can she rationally assign different probabilities or credences to propositions she knows imply each other? This is the problem I address in this article. I suggest that ‘p whenever q and vice versa’ may be consistent with p and q having different probabilities if one of them refers to a sample space containing ordinary possible worlds and the other to a sample space containing centred possible worlds, because such spaces may fail to combine into one composite probability space and, as a consequence, ‘whenever’ may not be well defined; such is the main contribution of this article. 1 The Sleeping Beauty Game2 Groisman’s and Peter Lewis’s Approaches3 Discussing Beauty’s Credences4 The Principle of Equivalence's Failure5 Making Sense of the Principle of Equivalence's Failure6 Elga’s and Lewis’s Approaches7 ConclusionAppendix

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“…In fact, Groisman reasons in accordance with ( ) in later writings (see e.g Groisman, Hallakoun, Vaidman [2013]…”

supporting

confidence: 59%

Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution

Luna¹

2020

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…Note that Peter Lewis [156] also addressed the Sleeping Beauty problem in the MWI framework, but advocated the halfer solution. The concept of the measure of existence allows a transparent analysis of his error, see [155]. In the discussion above I have shown a manifestation of the measures of existence of future worlds which will be created after the measurement.…”

Section: The Measure Of Existence Of Everett Worldsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum theory and determinism

Vaidman

2014

Quantum Stud.: Math. Found.

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Historically, appearance of the quantum theory led to a prevailing view that Nature is indeterministic. The arguments for the indeterminism and proposals for indeterministic and deterministic approaches are reviewed. These include collapse theories, Bohmian Mechanics and the many-worlds interpretation. It is argued that ontic interpretations of the quantum wave function provide simpler and clearer physical explanation and that the many-worlds interpretation is the most attractive since it provides a deterministic and local theory for our physical Universe explaining the illusion of randomness and nonlocality in the world we experience.

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“…The MWI ontology offers an additional resource for rationalizing the behaviour of premeasurement experimenters who believe the MWI. It offers a sense in which some descendants have a greater measure of existence [Vaidman, 1998;Greaves, 2004;Groisman et. al., 2013] than other descendants, in a way which may make pre-measurement agents care more about descendants that exist more.…”

Section: The Idea Of Quantum Self-location Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

In defence of the self-location uncertainty account of probability in the many-worlds interpretation

McQueen

Vaidman

2019

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in

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We defend the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) against the objection that it cannot explain why measurement outcomes are predicted by the Born probability rule. We understand quantum probabilities in terms of an observer's self-location probabilities. We formulate a probability postulate for the MWI: the probability of selflocation in a world with a given set of outcomes is the absolute square of that world's amplitude. We provide a proof of this postulate, which assumes the quantum formalism and two principles concerning symmetry and locality. We also show how a structurally similar proof of the Born rule is available for collapse theories. We conclude by comparing our account to the recent account offered by Sebens and Carroll.

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The measure of existence of a quantum world and the Sleeping Beauty Problem

Cited by 20 publications

References 21 publications

Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution

Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution

Quantum theory and determinism

In defence of the self-location uncertainty account of probability in the many-worlds interpretation

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