The Measurement Problem of Consciousness

Browning, Heather; Veit, Walter

doi:10.5840/philtopics20204815

Cited by 26 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…Furthermore, our use of such data assumes that the absence of the state of P-consciousness (in us, a conscious, sentient species) reveals responses that do not require the trait of P-consciousness – and perhaps this is incorrect [c.f. ( 76 )]. Nevertheless, such experiments are often used to study the nature of P-consciousness in humans; they use diverse manipulations to modify awareness (suggesting findings are not artifacts of a single methodology); humans' verbal reports provide unique insights into their subjective experiences; and furthermore, using human consciousness research to yield measures for use in animals is an orthodox approach [e.g., ( 63 )].…”

Section: Red Herrings: Responses That Do Not Require Sentiencementioning

confidence: 99%

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

Mason

Lavery

2022

Front. Vet. Sci.

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Debates around fishes' ability to feel pain concern sentience: do reactions to tissue damage indicate evaluative consciousness (conscious affect), or mere nociception? Thanks to Braithwaite's discovery of trout nociceptors, and concerns that current practices could compromise welfare in countless fish, this issue's importance is beyond dispute. However, nociceptors are merely necessary, not sufficient, for true pain, and many measures held to indicate sentience have the same problem. The question of whether fish feel pain – or indeed anything at all – therefore stimulates sometimes polarized debate. Here, we try to bridge the divide. After reviewing key consciousness concepts, we identify “red herring” measures that should not be used to infer sentience because also present in non-sentient organisms, notably those lacking nervous systems, like plants and protozoa (P); spines disconnected from brains (S); decerebrate mammals and birds (D); and humans in unaware states (U). These “S.P.U.D. subjects” can show approach/withdrawal; react with apparent emotion; change their reactivity with food deprivation or analgesia; discriminate between stimuli; display Pavlovian learning, including some forms of trace conditioning; and even learn simple instrumental responses. Consequently, none of these responses are good indicators of sentience. Potentially more valid are aspects of working memory, operant conditioning, the self-report of state, and forms of higher order cognition. We suggest new experiments on humans to test these hypotheses, as well as modifications to tests for “mental time travel” and self-awareness (e.g., mirror self-recognition) that could allow these to now probe sentience (since currently they reflect perceptual rather than evaluative, affective aspects of consciousness). Because “bullet-proof” neurological and behavioral indicators of sentience are thus still lacking, agnosticism about fish sentience remains widespread. To end, we address how to balance such doubts with welfare protection, discussing concerns raised by key skeptics in this debate. Overall, we celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those unconvinced that fish are sentient; laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating for welfare protections; and seek to show how precautionary principles still support protecting fish from physical harm.

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Section: Red Herrings: Responses That Do Not Require Sentiencementioning

confidence: 99%

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

Mason

Lavery

2022

Front. Vet. Sci.

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“…Translating the exact same methods across to non‐human animals will not work. Moreover, we cannot safely assume that ‘no report’ indicators developed for humans (such as the use of eye movements and pupil size to detect binocular rivalry; Tsuchiya et al., 2015 , Pitts et al., 2018 ), even if valid in the human case, are still tracking conscious experience in non‐human animals (Browning & Veit, 2020 ). How is this problem to be overcome?…”

Section: Moving Forward 2: Studying Sentience Using Methods From Huma...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 3 Versions of this point were made by many commentators on Key (2016), by Tye (2017), and more recently by Browning and Veit (2020). …”

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Animal sentience

Browning

Birch

2022

Philosophy Compass

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Sentience' sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research.

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“…In this article, I have discussed numerous animals such as snails, slugs, fruit flies, crabs, and bees, that many if not most will suspect not to have sufficient nervous system complexity to warrant an attribution of consciousness. While the scientific assessment of consciousness in nonhuman animals has methodological roadblocks (Browning and Veit 2020b), I hope to have made clear in this article that it is precisely in such comparatively "simple" animals that we have to begin an evolutionary investigation of consciousness. They are the best cues to what the gradual evolution of subjective experience may have been like, providing us with a rich diversity of alternative life history strategies.…”

Section: Conclusion and Further Directionsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Towards a Comparative Study of Animal Consciousness

Veit

2022

Biol Theory

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In order to develop a true biological science of consciousness, we have to remove humans from the center of reference and develop a bottom-up comparative study of animal minds, as Donald Griffin intended with his call for a “cognitive ethology.” In this article, I make use of the pathological complexity thesis (Veit 2022a, b, c) to show that we can firmly ground a comparative study of animal consciousness by drawing on the resources of state-based behavioral life history theory. By comparing the different life histories of gastropods and arthropods, we will be able to make better sense of the possible origins of consciousness and its function for organisms in their natural environments.

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The Measurement Problem of Consciousness

Cited by 26 publications

References 62 publications

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

Animal sentience

Towards a Comparative Study of Animal Consciousness

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