The Member-Level Determinants and Consequences of Party Legislative Obstruction in the U.S. Senate

Abstract

Are Senators cross-pressured by party influence and constituent demands on procedural votes? We present a theory positing that Senators are indeed cross-pressured between these two demands and that electorally vulnerable members use the increased salience of procedural votes to differentiate themselves from their party. In an analysis of Senate procedural votes since the 92nd Congress, we develop a new spatial measure of obstruction preference and demonstrate our finding in three ways. First, obstruction preferences have become more polarized as the Senate experiences more intense legislative obstruction. Second, electorally vulnerable members are most likely to break from their party on procedural votes. Third, we find that voters electorally reward majority party Senators who break from their party and behave like minority party obstructionists. Our findings suggest that, unlike the House, Senate procedural votes are special opportunities for lawmakers to separate themselves from their party.

The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster

“…This suggests that c M has a positive effect on the frequency of cloture votes and the proportion of cloture votes to tabling motions. Several scholars have documented a steady increase in the number of cloture votes and proportion of cloture votes to tabling motions since the 1970s (Algara and Zamadics, 2019;Binder et al, 2002;Koger, 2010). If c M has steadily risen during this period (Binder and Smith, 1997), the results of the model help to provide an explanation for this trend.…”