The metaphysics of groups

Effingham, Nikk

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9335-4

Cited by 42 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The location of the collection of individuals that constitutes an organization is the sum of the spatial locations of the members of the organization (cf. Effingham 2010). 14 So it is literally true that an organization can be where its members are not.…”

Section: A Solution Of the Location Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

The location problem in social ontology

Hindriks

2011

Synthese

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Mental, mathematical, and moral facts are difficult to accommodate within an overall worldview due to the peculiar kinds of properties inherent to them. In this paper I argue that a significant class of social entities also presents us with an ontological puzzle that has thus far not been addressed satisfactorily. This puzzle relates to the location of certain social entities. Where, for instance, are organizations located? Where their members are, or where their designated offices are? Organizations depend on their members for their existence, but the members of an organization can be where the organization is not. The designated office of an organization, however, need be little more than a mailbox. I argue that the problem can be solved by conceptualizing the relation between social entities and non-social entities as one of constitution, a relation of unity without identity. Constituted objects have properties that cannot be reduced to properties of the constituting objects. Thus, my attempt to solve the Location Problem results in an argument in favor of a kind of non-reductive materialism about the social.Keywords Constitution · Constitutive rule · Location · Organization · Non-reductive individualism · Normative power · Social ontology · Status Mathematical, mental, and moral facts are difficult to accommodate within an overall worldview. Mathematical entities present an ontological puzzle to philosophers because they are abstract. How the relation between mental and physical properties should be conceptualized is complicated by qualia because of their inherently subjective phenomenology. And the moral domain resists reduction, many believe,

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Section: A Solution Of the Location Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

The location problem in social ontology

Hindriks

2011

Synthese

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“…While there are immediate problems with a simple view of groups as sets (e.g., sets cannot and groups can vary in members across times and worlds), a more complicated view has been developed. Effingham () argues that groups like teams and committees are a sophisticated sort of set. The view might be extended to groups of Type 2 as well.…”

Section: What Are Social Groups?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Metaphysics of Social Groups

Ritchie

2015

Philosophy Compass

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Social groups, including racial and gender groups and teams and committees, seem to play an important role in our world. This article examines key metaphysical questions regarding groups. I examine answers to the question ‘Do groups exist?’ I argue that worries about puzzles of composition, motivations to accept methodological individualism, and a rejection of Racialism support a negative answer to the question. An affirmative answer is supported by arguments that groups are efficacious, indispensible to our best theories, and accepted given common sense. Then, I turn to an examination of the features of social groups. I argue that social groups can be divided into (at least) two sorts. Groups of Type 1 are organized social groups like courts and clubs. Groups of Type 2 are groups like Blacks, women, and lesbians. While groups of both sorts have some features in common, they also have marked differences in features. Finally, I turn to views of the nature of social groups. I argue that the difference in features provides evidence that social groups do not have a uniform nature. Teams and committees are structured wholes, while race and gender groups are social kinds.

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“…Other LIS contributions that are said to cover the philosophy of collection development tend to describe particular institutions' collection-development policies or ways in which such policies may be constructed. In philosophy, the concept of collection has been analyzed, and the ontological status of collections defined, directly by Galton (2010) and indirectly (as a group) by Uzquiano (2004) and Effingham (2010), among other metaphysicians. Taking a rather different approach, Cavell (2013) cites Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger in an essay on the philosophy of collecting; other aestheticians occasionally offer their own thoughts on that topic, but, in general, collecting has not been considered an activity worthy of philosophical attention.…”

Section: Toward a Philosophy Of Cpanda Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Science Is Neither

Furner¹

2015

lib

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Information science is not a science, nor is it primarily about information. In this paper, an argument is developed in support of the latter claim. A working definition of information is proposed, and doubts are raised about the extent to which each of five core subfields of information science/studies (information behavior, information retrieval, infometrics, information organization, and information ethics) has to do with information as defined. Several alternative candidates for the primary phenomenon of interest shared by those working in all five subfields are considered: these include data studies; knowledge studies; metadata studies; representation studies; relevance studies; and (as a branch of cultural studies) collection, preservation, and access studies. A prime candidate is identified, and some implications of such a reading for the application of philosophical approaches to information science/studies are highlighted.

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The metaphysics of groups

Cited by 42 publications

References 23 publications

The location problem in social ontology

The location problem in social ontology

The Metaphysics of Social Groups

Information Science Is Neither

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