Baselines are commonly used to enable harm identification. The temporal, the counterfactual and the duty-based normative baselines are the most prominent. Each of these captures an aspect of common conceptions of what it is to harm and be harmed. However, each baseline also fails to deliver workable identifications of harm when presented with certain types of case. Problematic cases are found readily in childhood, a venue in which harm identification is often called for. Without a reliable means of identifying harm in childhood, harm cannot properly play a central role in normative assessments of parental practices and state intervention. This paper presents childhood cases in which the prominent baselines fail and offers an alternative: the interest-based normative baseline. Should the interestbased normative baseline replace its rivals and reign supreme? I argue not, presenting a case for maintaining a suite of baselines for use in varying contexts.Keywords Harm Á Children Á Childhood interests Á Temporal baseline Á Counterfactual baseline Normative assessments of actions, policies and practices are almost invariably influenced by considerations of harm, and in particular, of harm to others. That an action may result in harm usually counts as a reason against it. That an action is unlikely to result in harm can be a reason to permit it. The place that harm occupies in normative reasoning varies according to theoretical standpoint and contextual factors, but variations occur against a stable background of harm's normative resonance. In fact, it is difficult to imagine what normative assessments would be like, were harm to be extirpated from our conceptual framework.