The Metaphysics of Mental Files

Prosser, Simon

doi:10.1111/phpr.12577

Cited by 7 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…However, there has been little discussion about the metaphysical underpinnings of meaning change. The exception here is Prosser (2020), who, while not strictly discussing meaning change, is concerned with diachronic sameness of 'modes of presentation'. 1 The central aim of this paper is to push this discussion forward.…”

Section: Synthesementioning

confidence: 99%

Enduring senses

Forbes

Wildman

2022

Synthese

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The meanings of words seem to change over time. But while there is a growing body of literature in linguistics and philosophy about meaning change, there has been little discussion about the metaphysical underpinnings of meaning change. The central aim of this paper is to push this discussion forward by surveying the terrain and advocating for a particular metaphysical picture. In so doing, we hope to clarify various aspects of the nature of meaning change, as well as prompt future philosophical investigation into this topic. More specifically, this paper has two parts. The first, broadly exploratory, part surveys various metaphysical accounts of meaning change. The goal here is to lay out the terrain, thereby highlighting some key choice points. Then, in the second part, after critiquing Prosser’s (Philosophy Phenomenol Res 100(3):657–676, 2020) exdurantism about ‘mental files’, we sketch and defend the enduring senses view of meaning change.

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Enduring senses

Forbes

Wildman

2022

Synthese

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“…Recanati (2016, pg. 23), for example, writes: “If there are two predicates F and G in the subject's file for a given individual (or in one of his files if he has several), the predicates are coordinated and the subject can infer that there is an x which is both F and G.” Prosser (2019, pg. 3) writes: “By definition, then, two tokens are of the same file [...] just if it is possible for the subject to trade on identity between them”.…”

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“…2626Prosser (2019) also suggests that file‐approach can be understood as a kind of Relationism. His discussion focuses on issues with the diachronic individuation of files.…”

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“…We take this to be unproblematic. But it could be avoided, if desired, by adopting a stage theory for object‐representations – as in (Prosser, 2019) – and framing ERF in terms of suitably related sequences of object‐representations.…”

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“…4141See (Fine, 2007), and (Onofri, 2017) for Relationist accounts of interpersonal coordination. Prosser (2019) discusses both interpersonal and diachronic coordination. Strictly speaking, he offers a stage‐theoretic account of files‐qua‐continuants.…”

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Mental filing

Goodman

Gray

2020

Nous

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We offer an interpretation of the mental files framework that eliminates the metaphor of files, information being contained in files, etc. The guiding question is whether, once we move beyond the metaphors, there is any theoretical role for files. We claim not. We replace the file‐metaphor with two theses: the semantic thesis that there are irreducibly relational representational facts (viz. facts about the coordination of representations); and the metasemantic thesis that processes tied to information‐relations ground those facts. In its canonical statement, the ‘file’‐theory makes reference to a certain kind of relational representational feature, and a certain kind of mental activity. Mental files need not come into it. In short, we posit mental filing without mental files. Our interpretation avoids awkward problems that arise on the standard interpretation and clarifies the explanatory commitments of the theory.

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Files are mental particulars: a rejoinder to the relationist challenge

Tałasiewicz

2022

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The paper is a rejoinder to a challenge against the particularist version of the mental files framework (MFF) posed by the relationist approach based on the notion of content coordination [such as recent attempt by Rachel Goodman and Aidan Gray in (Noûs https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12354 (2020)]. Relationists argue that important explanatory goals of MFF: (1) could be achieved without positing files as mental particulars, as there is a relationist notion of content coordination at hand that can be aptly used for “filing without files”; and (2) should be so achieved, as there are difficulties that afflict the particularist approach to MFF and the relationist account is simply better. However, both claims should be rejected. The particularist approach to MFF, properly interpreted, would not get into the troubles it is accused of generating. Indeed, it is the relationist approach that gets in trouble. Specifically, it lacks resources for explanation of nuances, which can be easily accounted for in terms of particularist interpretation, and, furthermore, it lowers the interdisciplinary standing of the whole framework. The particularist version is therefore better.

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The Metaphysics of Mental Files

Cited by 7 publications

References 36 publications

Enduring senses

Enduring senses

Mental filing

Files are mental particulars: a rejoinder to the relationist challenge

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