The Military Post-Mugabe

Abstract

This article argues that, through the coup, the military has become more visible in national politics in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. The current situation under President Mnangagwa marks a qualitative difference with the military under Mugabe’s rule. Currently, in now being more prominent, the military is politics and is the determinant of any political transition that may be forthcoming in Zimbabwe. However, if it deems it necessary, the military accommodates civilian politicians into politics in order to ‘sanitize’ the political landscape in its own interests. Simultaneously, despite their involvement in the coup, ordinary soldiers feel increasingly marginalized under Mnangagwa’s government.

Intra-Party Cohesion in Zimbabwe’s Ruling Party after Robert Mugabe

“…The intra-party fights at the DCC level showed that lack of cohesiveness was not only rampant at the top echelons of the party (with the military dimension added) as other studies might portray (see Bhatasara and Chiweshe, 2021;Hove, 2019;Maringira, 2021;Ruhanya, 2020;Tendi, 2019). It is not only elite dis-cohesion that weakens and fragments a party but lack of compliance and unity at the periphery.…”

“…As G40 attacks intensified, Mugabe eventually expelled Mnangagwa from the party and cabinet in November 2017. This led to a more overt involvement of the military in ZANU PF succession politics which worsened factionalism and is still shaping contemporary internal party politics in Zimbabwe (Maringira, 2021). In particular, Mnangagwa's forced exit precipitated a military coup coordinated by Mnangagwa's key ally then who was the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) commander, Constantino Chiwenga.…”

“…Given this context, we still know very little about how the internal party dynamics have evolved from the centre to the periphery. The preoccupation with many of these scholars is at the elite level of national leaders, especially the presidium and the relations between the party and security sector leaders (Hove, 2019;Maringira, 2021;Ruhanya, 2020;Tendi, 2019). There has been a paucity of analysis of ZANU PF's provincial and district structures and their relationships to the centre.…”

“…On the other end, the politburo disqualified Makamba from the race based on a hostile state security report (Pindula, 2021). As Maringira (2021), Ruhanya (2020) and Tendi (2020) argue, this gives a glimpse of the involvement of the security sector in ZANU PF politics with potential to cause ructions. Amid this controversy, Kazembe was declared the winner with 20,774 votes against Musarara's 17,919 votes.…”

Praising the Croc, Despising Nero: The Politics of Hero-Worshipping Leaders Through Music and Speech in Zimbabwe

“…They had various names, which they were called during the liberation struggle. The post-independence military is known as the Mafikizolo's because they have never been into the war (Maringira, 2016(Maringira, , 2021. They are less honored as heroes unless if they have engaged in a well-defined war, for example, the 1997 DRC war.…”