The modal status of the laws of nature. Tahko’s hybrid view and the kinematical/dynamical distinction

Hirèche, Salim; Linnemann, Niels; Michels, Robert; Vogt, Lisa

doi:10.1007/s13194-020-00335-4

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 14 publications

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“…Regarding the latter constraint, we have recently argued that the criterion provided by Tahko is inadequate, which means that non-absolutists need to look elsewhere. (See Hirèche et al 2021. ) The essentialist DTA theory by itself does not meet the two further requirements, but it can do so if combined with the proposed criterion for the metaphysical necessity of the laws based on the kinematical/dynamical distinction: the theory on its own gives us a metaphysical explanation of why some laws are metaphysically necessary (because they hold in virtue of the nature/essence of some universals) and the ontic reading of the kinematical/dynamical distinction adds a naturalistic and workable criterion for the metaphysical necessity of laws which allows us to determine which laws have this special modal status.…”

Section: Kinematical Constraints Modal Non-absolutism and Metaphysically Necessary Lawsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The strong arm of the law: a unified account of necessary and contingent laws of nature

et al. 2021

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A common feature of all standard theories of the laws of nature is that they are ‘absolutist’: They take laws to be either all metaphysically necessary or all contingent. Science, however, gives us reason to think that there are laws of both kinds, suggesting that standard theories should make way for ‘non-absolutist’ alternatives: theories which accommodate laws of both modal statuses. In this paper, we set out three explanatory challenges for any candidate non-absolutist theory, and discuss the prospects of the two extant candidates in light of these challenges. We then develop our own non-absolutist theory, the essentialist DTA account, which combines the nomic-necessitation or DTA account with an essentialist approach to metaphysical modality in order to meet the three explanatory challenges. Finally, we argue that the distinction between kinematical and dynamical laws found in physical theories supports both non-absolutism in general and our proposed essentialist DTA view in particular.

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Section: Kinematical Constraints Modal Non-absolutism and Metaphysically Necessary Lawsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The strong arm of the law: a unified account of necessary and contingent laws of nature

et al. 2021

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Are All Laws of Nature Created Equal? Meta-laws Versus More Necessary Laws

Hirèche,

Linnemann,

Michels

2023

Erkenn

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Two approaches to elevating certain laws of nature over others have come to prominence recently. On the one hand, according to the meta-laws approach, there are meta-laws, laws which relate to laws as those laws relate to particular facts. On the other hand, according to the modal, or non-absolutist, approach, some laws are necessary in a stricter sense than others. Both approaches play an important role in current research, questioning the ‘orthodoxy’ represented by the leading philosophical theories of natural laws—Humeanism, the DTA view, dispositional essentialism and primitivism. This paper clarifies the relations between these two emerging approaches, as well as their applicability to physical laws and the status of the challenges they pose for standard theories of laws of nature. We first argue that, despite some significant similarities between the two approaches (especially in the context of Lange’s counterfactual account of laws), they are in general distinct and largely independent of each other. Then, we argue that the support for meta-laws from physical theory and practice is more questionable than usually presented.

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Lagrangian possibilities

Ruyant,

Guay

2024

Synthese

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Natural modalities are often analysed from an abstract point of view where they are associated with putative laws of nature. However, the way possibilities are represented in physics is more complex. Lagrangian mechanics, for instance, involves two different layers of modalities: kinematical and dynamical possibilities. This paper examines the status of these two layers, both in the classical and quantum case. The quantum case is particularly problematic: we identify four possible interpretive options. The upshot is that a close inspection of the way possibilities are represented in physics could lead to new ways of thinking about natural modalities.

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The modal status of the laws of nature. Tahko’s hybrid view and the kinematical/dynamical distinction

Cited by 3 publications

References 14 publications

The strong arm of the law: a unified account of necessary and contingent laws of nature

The strong arm of the law: a unified account of necessary and contingent laws of nature

Are All Laws of Nature Created Equal? Meta-laws Versus More Necessary Laws

Lagrangian possibilities

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