The Modern Corporation Statement on Company Law

Stout, Lynn A.; Robé, J-P.; Ireland, Paddy; Deakin, Simon; Greenfield, Kent; Johnston, Andrew; Schepel, Harm; Blair, Margaret M.; Talbot, Lorraine; Dignam, Alan; Dine, Janet; Millon, David K.; Sjåfjell, Beate; Villiers, Charlotte; Williams, Cynthia A.; Koutsias, Marios; Pendleton, Andrew; Davis, Gerald F.; Galanis, Michael; Chandler, David; Keay, Andrew; Moore, Marc; Plessis, Jean Jacques du; Bather, Andrea; Lefler, Beau; Bradshaw, Carrie; Bruner, Christopher M.; Joo, Thomas Wuil; Greenwood, Daniel J.H.; Clarke, Thomas; Johnson, Larry; Mulazzi, F.; Lipton, Martin J.; Liao, Carol; Johnson, Rebecca; Beck, A. Cornelia; Markel, Gregory A; Currie, Wendy L.; Partnoy, Frank; Peklar, L. F.; Silveira, Alexandre Di Miceli da; Sitbon, O; González-Cantón, César; Chanteau, J-P.; Donaggio, Angela Rita Franco; Esser, I-M.; North, Gill; Ricci, Sergio Alberto Gramitto; Tomasic, Roman; Pillay, Renginee G.; O'Kelly, Ciarán; Keating, Con; Willmott, H. C.; Veldman, Jeroen; Morrow, Paige

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2848833

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…In fact, nowhere do corporate officers and directors have a legally enforceable duty to maximize short term shareholder value. 9 And even in the United States, as aptly written by Lynn Stout, « U.S. corporate law does not, and never has, required public corporations to « maximize shareholder value » … The idea is a fable ». 10 Many judicial opinions describe the directors' fiduciary duties as being owed « to the corporation and its shareholders », which implies that the two are not the same.…”

Section: Fablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Shareholder Value Mess (And How to Clean it Up)

Robé

2019

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium

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Section: Fablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Shareholder Value Mess (And How to Clean it Up)

Robé

2019

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium

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“…As an 'entity view' directs the board's duties, including its reporting duties, toward the entity, and enables a discretionary space that allows the board to include broader interests than just those of ideal-typical shareholders in corporate decision making, the entity view allows to interpret the object and the audience of reporting differently from PAT (Biondi, 2011;Biondi et al, 2007;Eisenberg, 1969;Lan & Heracleous, 2010;Nordberg & McNulty, 2013;Segrestin & Hatchuel, 2011;Sjåfjell, 2018;Stout, 2012b;Stout et al, 2016;Veldman & Willmott, 2017b).…”

Section: Object and Audiencementioning

confidence: 99%

Planetary Boundaries and Corporate Reporting: The Role of the Conceptual Basis of the Corporation

Veldman

Jansson

2020

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium

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There is a broad call to integrate planetary boundaries and life-cycle based reporting into accounting theory and reporting standards. Although many practitioners back this call, including insurers, shareholders with a long-term orientation, and company law specialists who suggest that the inclusion of long-term stakeholder interests is necessary to counter both corporate and systemic risks, it remains unanswered. We argue that dominant assumptions about the status and architecture of corporations in corporate governance theory stand at the centre of this unanswered call in accounting theory and practice. As the status of the public corporation is interpreted as a nexus of contracts and its architecture as a restricted dyadic relation between ‘principals’ and ‘agents’, the object and audience for corporate reports are restricted to a very specific set of actors, interests and time-horizons. We argue that this conceptual setup unduly restricts notions of accountability and is connected to a specific notion of political economy. A broadening of reporting standards needs, therefore, to be accompanied by a critical assessment of the assumed object and audience of reporting in corporate governance theory.

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Corporate/Corporation

Sheehy¹

2021

Encyclopedia of Sustainable Management

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The Modern Corporation Statement on Company Law

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

The Shareholder Value Mess (And How to Clean it Up)

The Shareholder Value Mess (And How to Clean it Up)

Planetary Boundaries and Corporate Reporting: The Role of the Conceptual Basis of the Corporation

Corporate/Corporation

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