2020
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12490
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The monitoring role of the media: Evidence from earnings management

Abstract: In response to the recent debate on the media, this paper examines the effect of media coverage on firm earnings management. Even if prior studies (Dyck et al., 2010;Miller, 2006) have documented the media's role in detecting and deterring accounting fraud (or extreme earnings management), it is unclear ex ante whether the media amplifies or curbs less egregious earnings management. Our results show that media coverage is negatively associated with both accrual-based and real earnings management, suggesting th… Show more

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Cited by 60 publications
(46 citation statements)
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“…Miller (2006) and Dyck et al (2010) demonstrate the role that media monitoring can play in curbing opportunistic management behaviors such as accounting fraud or extreme surplus management. Chen et al (2021) find that the rise in the number of media reports can effectively curb the degree of accrual surplus management and real activity surplus management of firms, indicating that the media, as external monitoring, can curb managers' opportunistic surplus management. Consequently, management opportunistic behavior has been effectively curbed when the intensity of media regulation is relatively higher.…”
Section: Research Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…Miller (2006) and Dyck et al (2010) demonstrate the role that media monitoring can play in curbing opportunistic management behaviors such as accounting fraud or extreme surplus management. Chen et al (2021) find that the rise in the number of media reports can effectively curb the degree of accrual surplus management and real activity surplus management of firms, indicating that the media, as external monitoring, can curb managers' opportunistic surplus management. Consequently, management opportunistic behavior has been effectively curbed when the intensity of media regulation is relatively higher.…”
Section: Research Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…One of the essential causes of inefficient labor investment is information asymmetry. Media coverage, in general serving as an external monitor of firms' executives, can help curb earnings management and make financial reporting more transparent (Chen et al 2021), thereby mitigating labor investment inefficiency arising from information asymmetry.…”
Section: Information Disclosure Mechanismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In line with Chen et al (2021), we employ accrual earnings management (EM) to measure the quality of firms' information disclosure. Similar to the mechanism 10 show the results of the information disclosure mechanism.…”
Section: Information Disclosure Mechanismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Strengthened by the internet, nowadays (social) media are considered as the Fifth Estate (Sormanen & Dutton, 2015), and they serve as soft control of traditional media (Lahey, 2016). Chen et al (2021) also examine the effect of media coverage on firm earnings management, documenting the media's role in detecting and deterring accounting fraud (or extreme earnings management). Authors suggest that the media serves as an external monitor that curbs managers' opportunistic accounting behaviors.…”
Section: Component #6: the Watchdogmentioning
confidence: 99%