The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence From Colombia

Acemoğlu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Santos, Rafael J.

doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01099.x

Cited by 294 publications

(102 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Existing research has established, via natural experiments in a variety of contexts, that electoral malpractices have material influence on election outcomes (Golden and Tiwari 2009, Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2009, Baland and Robinson 2009. On the specific topic of vote-selling, research has shown it to be more prevalent among poor voters (Scott 1969, Stokes 2005, Blaydes 2006, Bratton 2008, and that parties, candidates and brokers are often strategic regarding which populations they target for vote-buying (Stokes et.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines

Hicken

Leider

Ravanilla

et al. 2018

Journal of Development Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may• from the SSRN website:www. SSRN.com • from the RePEc website:www. RePEc.org • from the CESifo website:T www. CESifo-group.org/wpT CESifo Working Paper No. 4828 Temptation in Vote-Selling: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines AbstractWe test the predictions of a behavioral model of transactional electoral politics in the context of a randomized anti-vote-selling intervention in the Philippines. We model selling one's vote as a temptation good: it creates positive utility for the future self at the moment of voting, but not for past selves who anticipate the vote-sale. We also allow keeping or breaking promises regarding vote-selling to affect utility. Voters who are at least partially sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation can thus use promises not to vote-sell as a commitment device. An invitation to promise not to vote-sell is taken up by a majority of respondents, reduces vote-selling, and has a larger effect in electoral races with smaller vote-buying payments. The more effective promise treatment reduces vote-selling in the smallest-stakes election by 10.9 percentage points. Inviting voters to make another type of promise -to accept vote-buying payments, but to nonetheless "vote your conscience" -is significantly less effective. The results are consistent with voters being partially (but not fully) sophisticated about their voteselling temptation.JEL-Code: D030, D720, O120.Keywords: vote-selling, vote-buying, temptation, self-control, commitment, elections, political economy, Philippines. We thank Joma Gonzalez (Innovations for Poverty Action) for unparalleled field management, Vibha Mehta for her contributions to the field work and analysis, and seminar participants at Georgia Institute of Technology, Simon Fraser University, University of British Columbia, the World Bank, and Georgetown University. This study was made possible by funding from the MCubed program at the University of Michigan. 1 Allen Hicken Department of Political IntroductionVote-buying and vote-selling are pervasive phenomena in many developing democracies. While there is some debate about the consequences of the buying and selling of votes, there is a consensus that transactional electoral politics brings with it a host of costs. For example, vote-buying and other forms of clientelism can undermine or even reverse the standard accountability relations...

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines

Hicken

Leider

Ravanilla

et al. 2018

Journal of Development Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…First, Baland and Robinson (2008), in their work on mid-twentieth century Chilean elections, show how landlords are able to influence electoral outcomes by inducing their tenants to vote for one particular party. The second paper, by Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2013), explores the impact of the presence of nonstate armed groups on electoral outcomes in Colombia for the years 1991-2006: in areas with a strong paramilitary presence there was, after 2001, a significant increase in votes for candidates whose preferences were close to those of the armed groups.…”

Section: Mr Messina No It Doesn't the Whole Thing Is A Farce!mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Adapting the theoretical framework developed by Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2013) to the case of an electoral system with proportional representation and a single national constituency, we analyze the equilibrium of a game in which parties compete not only for voters but also for the support of the mafia present in one of the regions in which the country is divided. We show that the incumbent wins the competition for the mafia support and that support from the mafia increases when the advantage of the incumbent shrinks in the regions without mafia.…”

Section: Mr Messina No It Doesn't the Whole Thing Is A Farce!mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 With respect to the work of Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2013), we base our analysis on a much longer period, including 12 elections, rely on a large set of time-varying controls, and implement an instrumental variable strategy to address the potential nonrandom distribution of the mafia. Another key difference between their paper and ours is the nature of the organization coercing voters we consider.…”

Section: Mr Messina No It Doesn't the Whole Thing Is A Farce!mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another key difference between their paper and ours is the nature of the organization coercing voters we consider. Colombian paramilitary groups, the focus of Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2013), were formed and sponsored by large landlords to counter the activities of the leftist guerrilla groups. Hence, from their very origin they were organizations with a strong political connotation.…”

Section: Mr Messina No It Doesn't the Whole Thing Is A Farce!mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mafia in the Ballot Box

Feo

Luca

2017

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

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We study the impact of organized crime on electoral results, analyzing in detail the national parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946–1992. We document the significant support given by the Sicilian mafia to the Christian Democratic Party when the electoral competition by the Communist Party strengthened. We also provide suggestive evidence that, in exchange for its electoral support, the mafia obtained economic advantages in the construction sector. (JEL D72, K42, L74)

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The Persistence and Change of Institutions in the Americas

Acemoğlu

Robinson

2008

Southern Economic Journal

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Though many empirical and theoretical approaches to comparative development assume that institutions persist for long periods of time, specific institutions vary a lot over periods as long as a century. Therefore, a convincing theory of institutional persistence must explain how persistence of institutional equilibria and accompanying incentive environment is consistent with changes in specific institutions. In this paper, we propose a simple explanation of how economic institutions may persist even when political institutions change and illustrate it with the economic history of the U.S. South and some examples from Latin American history.

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The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence From Colombia

Cited by 294 publications

References 21 publications

Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines

Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines

Mafia in the Ballot Box

The Persistence and Change of Institutions in the Americas

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