2020
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12705
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The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self‐Defense

Abstract: Some, but not all, of the mistakes a person makes when acting in apparently necessary self-defense are reasonable: we take them not to violate the rights of the apparent aggressor. I argue that this is explained by duties grounded in agents' entitlements to a fair distribution of the risk of suffering unjust harm. I suggest that the content of these duties is filled in by a social signaling norm, and offer some moral constraints on the form such a norm can take.

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Cited by 5 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Falsenegative errors involve not using deadly force against suspects who are a future threat and inflict grave harm after their escape. 33 Neither the imminence requirement nor the prevailing status quo for police can avoid both errors entirely. The imminence requirement places a more stringent restriction on deadly force than the status quo and thus comes with greater risk of false-negative errors.…”
Section: Doctrine Of Doing and Allowingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Falsenegative errors involve not using deadly force against suspects who are a future threat and inflict grave harm after their escape. 33 Neither the imminence requirement nor the prevailing status quo for police can avoid both errors entirely. The imminence requirement places a more stringent restriction on deadly force than the status quo and thus comes with greater risk of false-negative errors.…”
Section: Doctrine Of Doing and Allowingmentioning
confidence: 99%