The Morality of Belief I: How Beliefs Wrong

Basu, Rima

doi:10.1111/phc3.12934

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…In the ethics of (human) belief, a growing cohort of philosophers are coming to hold the opinion that human agents can doxastically wrong each other -that is, they can morally wrong each other just in virtue of holding certain beliefs about each other. Doxastic wronging is a concept introduced by ethicists of belief Rima Basu and Mark Schroeder (Basu & Schroeder, 2019;Basu, 2018bBasu, , 2019aBasu, , 2023a. In a series of papers, they suggest that human agents can morally wrong one another not just via their actions or speech, but also in virtue of their beliefs, whether or not these beliefs are acted upon or made known to the person(s) whom the belief is about.…”

Section: Doxastic Wronging By Aimentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward an Ethics of AI Belief

Ma,

Valton

2024

Philos. Technol.

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In this paper we, an epistemologist and a machine learning scientist, argue that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI – the ethics of belief for AI. Here we take the ethics of belief to refer to a field at the intersection of epistemology and ethics concerned with possible moral, practical, and other non-truth-related dimensions of belief. In this paper we will primarily be concerned with the normative question within the ethics of belief regarding what agents – both human and artificial – ought to believe, rather than with questions concerning whether beliefs meet certain evaluative standards such as being true, being justified, constituting knowledge, etc. We suggest four topics in extant work in the ethics of (human) belief that can be applied to an ethics of AI belief: doxastic wronging by AI (morally wronging someone in virtue of beliefs held about them); morally owed beliefs (beliefs that agents are morally obligated to hold); pragmatic and moral encroachment (cases where the practical or moral features of a belief is relevant to its epistemic status, and in our case specifically to whether an agent ought to hold the belief); and moral responsibility for AI beliefs. We also indicate two relatively nascent areas of philosophical research that haven’t yet been generally recognized as ethics of AI belief research, but that do fall within this field of research in virtue of investigating various moral and practical dimensions of belief: the epistemic and ethical decolonization of AI; and epistemic injustice in AI.

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Section: Doxastic Wronging By Aimentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward an Ethics of AI Belief

Ma,

Valton

2024

Philos. Technol.

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Slurring silences

Holdier

2024

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Silence can be a communicative act. Tanesini (2018) demonstrates how “eloquent” silences can virtuously indicate resistance and dissent; in this paper, I outline one way silence can also be used viciously to cause discursive harm, specifically by slurring victims. By distinguishing between eloquent and “signaling” silences (two kinds of what I call “performative” silences), I show how “slurring” silences — fully quiet discursive moves that signal one's commitment to a slurring perspective — function in a manner that illuminates the pragmatic topography of conversational silence in general.

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The Morality of Belief I: How Beliefs Wrong

Cited by 2 publications

References 43 publications

Toward an Ethics of AI Belief

Toward an Ethics of AI Belief

Slurring silences

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