The Morality of Resisting Oppression

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the contemporary moral reading of women’s oppression, and revises our understanding of the practical reasons for action a victim of mistreatment acquires through her unjust circumstances. The paper surveys various ways of theorising victims’ moral duties to resist their own oppression, and considers objections to prior academic work arguing for the existence of an imperfect Kantian duty of resistance to oppression grounded in self-respect. These objections suggest (1) that such a duty is victim blaming; (2) that it distorts the normative direction of self-regarding duties; and (3) that consequentialist reasons are inapt for justifying self-regarding ethical responsibilities. The paper then argues that the need for normative coherence in our very concept of a moral duty is of paramount importance, and especially so in the fight against patriarchal oppression. Accordingly, we should acknowledge the salient differences between pro tanto or defeasible moral reasons and fully fledged moral duties identifying agent-relative obligatory action. The paper concludes that we better respect and defend women’s rights when first we understand them as having, at best, defeasible moral reasons to oppose their oppression; and second, ensure that we make adequate allowance for a woman’s interpretative right to choose how to respond to her oppressive circumstances.

“Cheerleaders” and “Mama Bears”: Combatting Sexist Teacher Strike Discourse

“…(By extension, we can add here an obligation to resist inadequate compensation in general but especially relative to less-feminized fields.) Finally, Rebecca Hannah Smith (2020) argues that if we recognize women as having moral reasons to oppose their own oppression, then we better "respect and defend women's rights" (p. 1). According to Smith, while women are not morally obligated to resist their own oppression, they have pro tanto moral reasons for doing so.…”