The Motivational Effects of School-Based Performance Awards

Kelley, Carolyn; Odden, Allan; Milanowski, Anthony; Heneman, Herbert G.

doi:10.1037/e384162004-001

Cited by 19 publications

(31 citation statements)

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“…For example, three researchers studied school-based incentive pay systems in Kentucky, North Carolina (Charlotte-Mecklenburg), and Maryland. 44 They concluded that in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Kentucky programs, but not in the Maryland program, both teacher motivation and student outcomes improved. But because all three studies lacked a control group, they could not establish definitively that the program itself-and not some other factor-was the cause of the improvements.…”

Section: Evidence From the United Statesmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…This result is assumed to flow from a common interest in improved outcomes. 6 Other Potential Benefits. Critics of traditional pay schemes that reward experience and formal qualifications instead of performance argue that these schemes are unfair to highly motivated, effective, and efficient teachers whose extra efforts are not rewarded.…”

Section: Productivity and Efficiency Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Using Performance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers

Lavy

2007

foc

114

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Tying teachers' pay to their classroom performance should, says Victor Lavy, improve the current educational system both by clarifying teaching goals and by attracting and retaining the most productive teachers. But implementing pay for performance poses many practical challenges, because measuring individual teachers' performance is difficult.Lavy reviews evidence on individual and school-based incentive programs implemented in recent years both in the United States and abroad. Lavy himself evaluated two carefully designed programs in Israel and found significant gains in student and teacher performance. He observes that research evidence suggests, although not conclusively, that pay-for-performance incentives can improve teachers' performance, although they can also lead to unintended and undesired consequences, such as teachers' directing their efforts exclusively to rewarded activities.Lavy also offers general guidelines for designing effective programs. He emphasizes that the system must measure true performance in a way that minimizes random variation as well as undesired and unintended consequences. It must align performance with ultimate outcomes and must be monitored closely to discourage gaming if not outright fraud in measured output. Goals should be attainable. Incentives should balance individual rewards with school incentives, fostering a cooperative culture but not at the expense of free riding. All teachers should be eligible for the incentive offered, but only a subset of teachers should be rewarded in practice. If too many teachers are rewarded, teachers may not need to exert much extra effort to benefit.Many of the practical challenges faced by performance-related pay, Lavy says, can be addressed through careful design of the system. He emphasizes that setting up a performance-related pay system that works is not a one-time task. Even with the best preparation, initial implementation is likely to be problematic. But if the effort is seen as ongoing, it should be possible to make progress gradually in developing incentives that motivate the desired teaching behaviors and that will be perceived by teachers as fair and accurate.

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Section: Evidence From the United Statesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Productivity and Efficiency Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Using Performance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers

Lavy

2007

foc

114

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“…En el tema educacional, entre las diferentes investigaciones que consideran la motivación cabe destacar la de Kelley (1999), que dirige su atención a la motivación en los profesores. Estudia el impacto motivador de los premios de actuación en la escuela.…”

Section: Hipótesis Y Modelo Propuestounclassified

“…La motivación como principio de la confianza para la incorporación de proyectos educativos… Kelley, C. (1999) Recompensas extrínsecas e intrísecas Venkatesh, R.; Challagalla, G. y Kohli, A.K. 2001Recompensas PARTICIPACIÓN Homburg, C.;Jesen, O. y Krohmer, H. (2008) Trabajo El cuestionario fue estructurado en tres partes diferentes, preguntas de clasificación de la unidad educativa; de clasificación del maestro y preguntas relativas a la medición de las variables del modelo.…”

Section: Intrínsecunclassified

La motivación como principio de la confianza para la incorporación de proyectos educativos. El caso particular de Bolivia

Santiváñez¹,

Avello²,

Miranda³

2011

RIEOEI

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El mundo, en la actualidad, está inmerso en una "revolución tecnológica" (Castells, 2001). Las Nuevas Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación son necesarias para construir un nuevo marco educativo, a fin de introducir a los estudiantes en esta nueva era. Una mayoría de países ya han incorporado las NTIC en el sistema educativo. Otros, como el caso de Bolivia, aún no logran despegar. El propósito de este trabajo tiene dos perspectivas. Desde un punto de vista conceptual, se plantea un modelo explicativo capaz de analizar las principales variables que influyan en el compromiso de los maestros con el desarrollo de estrategias eficaces en la incorporación de las NTIC en el currículo educativo; contribuyendo a la creación de una teoría inexistente, sobre la motivación como principio de la confianza y, al mismo tiempo ambas como factores decisivos para el compromiso.

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“…is intrinsically motivating'. Kelly (1999) reported that most teachers placed a higher value on intrinsic rewards (see also Kelly and Protsik, 1997). 22 Bowles and Gintis (1999: 10) argue that both experimental and historical evidence sheds enough evidence to enable policy design to 'tap powerful reciprocity motives'.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Key Parameters in Policy Design: The Case of Intrinsic Motivation

Jones

Cullis

2003

J. Soc. Pol.

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An important consideration when designing social policy is the expected response of individuals to new taxes and expenditures. Response is predictable when individuals are assumed to optimise instrumentally. However, the extent to which instrumental behaviour can be deemed ‘representative’ has been questioned. Behavioural experiments reveal that individuals rely more heavily on low-cost signals and heuristics than on an optimising calculus. When costs and benefits are not easy to discern the consequences of action are difficult to estimate and perceptions of the intrinsic value of action assume greater relevance. Such considerations are particularly apposite when social policy affects altruism. In this paper the proposition is that policy signals impact on motivation systematically. Policy can have a greater (or lesser) impact than anticipated by instrumental response to the sum of its parts. Two examples prove illustrative. The first considers institutional reform and the supply of ‘merit wants’. The second focuses on recent proposals to nurture the voluntary charitable sector. In both cases, policy expectations based only on instrumental response prove misleading; the impact of policy signals on perceptions of the intrinsic value of action cannot be ignored.

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The Motivational Effects of School-Based Performance Awards

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Using Performance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers

Using Performance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers

La motivación como principio de la confianza para la incorporación de proyectos educativos. El caso particular de Bolivia

Key Parameters in Policy Design: The Case of Intrinsic Motivation

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