2019
DOI: 10.1137/17m114114x
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Multiplier-Penalty Method for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems in Banach Spaces

Abstract: This paper deals with generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) in Banach spaces. We prove an existence result for normalized equilibria of jointly convex GNEPs and then propose an augmented Lagrangian-type algorithm for their computation. A thorough convergence analysis is conducted which considers the existence of subproblem solutions as well as feasibility and optimality of limit points. We then apply our investigations to a class of multiobjective optimal control problems which are governed by a linear… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
14
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
1
1

Relationship

2
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 15 publications
(16 citation statements)
references
References 38 publications
2
14
0
Order By: Relevance
“…As before, we discretize the domain Ω := (0, 1) 2 by means of a uniform grid with n ∈ N interior points per row or column. The problem in question is a four-player game where f := 1, The results of the iteration are displayed in Figure 3 and agree with those in [33]. The corresponding iteration numbers are given as follows.…”
Section: Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problemssupporting
confidence: 65%
“…As before, we discretize the domain Ω := (0, 1) 2 by means of a uniform grid with n ∈ N interior points per row or column. The problem in question is a four-player game where f := 1, The results of the iteration are displayed in Figure 3 and agree with those in [33]. The corresponding iteration numbers are given as follows.…”
Section: Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problemssupporting
confidence: 65%
“…This has the benefit that we avoid the computation of projections and distance functions involving H 1 + (Ω). The resulting modifications to Algorithm 4.1 are fairly straightforward (see, for instance, [6,8,38]). Indeed, the augmented subproblems are now (constrained) variational n = 256, β = 1 n = 256, β = 0.01 n = 1024, β = 1 n = 1024, β = 0.01 k ρ k σ k ρ k σ k ρ k σ k ρ k σ k inequalities over the set {q ∈ H 1 (Ω) : q ≥ α}.…”
Section: Parameter Estimation In Elliptic Systemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, the set M is nonconvex in general, and (1) is the natural framework for our setting. Variational inequalities are a well-known and popular class in both finite and infinitedimensional optimization since they unify various problem types such as constrained minimization and equilibrium-type problems, in particular Nash and (certain) generalized Nash equilibrium problems [16,17,21,30,38]. This opens up a broad spectrum of applications including optimal control, parameter estimation, differential games, and problems in mechanics or shape optimization.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This formulation is often referred to as a generalized Nash equilibrium; see, e.g., [24,28,29]. However, as noted in [36], it is really a standard Nash equilibrium in the sense of (1.1) since functions are allowed to take the value +∞.…”
Section: Example 33 (Minimax)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, suppose that G 1 = H 1 0 (Ω) and L 1 = S. Then we recover frameworks investigated in [9,29].…”
Section: Example 33 (Minimax)mentioning
confidence: 99%