The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games

Cooperation and Institution in Games

“…In contrast to the classic cooperative game approach, in Okada (), I show that a non‐cooperative bargaining approach can derive a reasonable core concept with an externality. My idea is based on the consistency of a solution, as follows.…”

“…In Okada (), I extend the random‐proposer model to an n ‐person cooperative game in strategic form. The negotiation rule is the same as that of the basic model described in Subsection 2.2.…”

“…Theorem ( Okada, 2010 ) Let Γ( G , p , δ ) be the random‐proposer model for an n ‐person game G in strategic form. As the continuation probability δ tends to one, the allocation of the grand coalition SSPE for Γ( G , p , δ ) converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution of G that solves the maximization problem where the weight p i of player i is given by the recognition probability p , and the disagreement point d = ( d 1 , · · ·, d n ) is given by a Nash equilibrium payoff of G (in mixed strategies).…”

Eliciting information from a committee

“…In contrast, in this paper the choice of the probability distribution over policies after a disagreement is the policy maker's instrument for manipulation of the experts' collusive behavior. This paper is also related to the non-cooperative theory of multilateral bargaining that goes back to Rubinstein (1982) and has been further developed by Binmore (1987), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Krishna and Serrano (1996), Okada (1996Okada ( , 2010, with particular focus on bargaining in legislative bodies in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Jackson and Moselle (2002), and Duggan (2000, 2006). This paper is different in two aspects.…”

“…A noncooperative model that implements the Nash bargaining solution is, for instance, the random proposer model of Okada (1996Okada ( , 2010. 15 At every round t = 1, 2, .…”