The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian

Rachmilevitch, Shiran

doi:10.1007/s11238-014-9477-5

Cited by 22 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…This inequality follows from the combination of: (i) the above cited result from Rachmilevitch (2014), and (ii) Eq. (4).…”

Section: Corollary 2 For Every S Such That {α M P (S) α a (S) α N (mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In Rachmilevitch (2014), I showed that N not only respects the EU bounds, but, moreover, N (S) is between U (S) and A(S) (for every S on which U and A are singlevalued). Combining this result with the analysis developed here implies that, on the part on S's frontier which stretches from E(S) to U (S), the point A(S) is between N (S) and M P(S).…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a recent paper (Rachmilevitch 2014), I showed that the fact that N satisfies Cao's bounds can be strengthened: it was proved in that paper that the following is true for any comprehensive problem S whose utilitarian point, U (S), is unique:…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Rachmilevitch (2014), I derived an axiomatization of N on the basis of the EU bounds (on the domain of comprehensive problems, N is the unique scale-invariant solution that respects them), and I showed that for any S for which RU (S) = K S(S), the part of S's Pareto frontier that ranges between RU (S) and K S(S) can be narrowed to a smaller range in which N (S) is guaranteed to lie. In particular, it was shown that, in certain senses, N (S) is closer to RU (S) than it is to K S(S).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Egalitarian–utilitarian bounds in Nash’s bargaining problem

Rachmilevitch

2015

Theory Decis

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For every 2-person bargaining problem, the Nash bargaining solution selects a point that is "between" the relative (or normalized) utilitarian point and the relative egalitarian (i.e., Kalai-Smorodinsky) point. Also, it is "between" the (non-normalized) utilitarian and egalitarian points. I improve these bounds. I also derive a new characterization of the Nash solution which combines a bounds property together with strong individual rationality and an axiom which is new to Nash's bargaining model, the sandwich axiom. The sandwich axiom is a weakening of Nash's IIA.

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“…This inequality follows from the combination of: (i) the above cited result from Rachmilevitch (2014), and (ii) Eq. (4).…”

Section: Corollary 2 For Every S Such That {α M P (S) α a (S) α N (mentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Egalitarian–utilitarian bounds in Nash’s bargaining problem

Rachmilevitch

2015

Theory Decis

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“…A rule utilitarian then would not be too much dissatisfied with the rules devised for the two-step social contract of the firm. Nevertheless, under interpersonal comparability of utility, normally Utilitarianism differs from and is less egalitarian than the Nash Bargaining Solution (see Brock 1979;Rachmilevitch 2015).…”

Section: Appendix 1: Can the Normative Justification Of The Stakeholdmentioning

confidence: 99%

Justice and Corporate Governance: New Insights from Rawlsian Social Contract and Sen’s Capabilities Approach

Fia

Sacconi

2018

J Bus Ethics

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By considering what we identify as a problem inherent in the 'nature of the firm'-the risk of abuse of authority-we propound the conception of a social contract theory of the firm which is truly Rawlsian in its inspiration. Hence, we link the social contract theory of the firm (justice at firm's level) with the general theory of justice (justice at society's level). Through this path, we enter the debate about whether firms can be part of Rawlsian theory of justice showing that corporate governance principles enter the "basic structure." Finally, we concur with Sen's aim to broaden the realm of social justice beyond what he calls the 'transcendental institutional perfectionism' of Rawls' theory. We maintain the contractarian approach to justice but introduce Sen's capability concept as an element of the constitutional and post-constitutional contract model of institutions with special reference to corporate governance. Accordingly, rights over primary goods and capabilities are (constitutionally) granted by the basic institutions of society, but many capabilities have to be turned into the functionings of many stakeholders through the operation of firms understood as post-constitutional institutional domains. The constitutional contract on the distribution of primary goods and capabilities should then shape the principles of corporate governance so that at post-constitutional level anyone may achieve her/his functionings in the corporate domain by exercising such capabilities. In the absence of such a condition, post-constitutional contracts would distort the process that descends from constitutional rights and capabilities toward social outcomes.

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Between Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism: Some Ethical Aspects of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Rachmilevitch

2022

Bargaining

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The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian

Cited by 22 publications

References 22 publications

Egalitarian–utilitarian bounds in Nash’s bargaining problem

Egalitarian–utilitarian bounds in Nash’s bargaining problem

Justice and Corporate Governance: New Insights from Rawlsian Social Contract and Sen’s Capabilities Approach

Between Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism: Some Ethical Aspects of the Nash Bargaining Solution

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