The Natural and the Supernatural in Human Nature: Hegel on the Soul

Brinkmann, Klaus

doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2614-6_1

Cited by 4 publications

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“…According to Redding 'Fichte declares that sensation never appears within consciousness as such as an "isolated presentation", but always in some conceptualized form, as posited "intuition", or, we would say, perception' (Redding 1999: 97). 34 On this point, see Bourgeois (1994), Brinkmann (1998) and Pinkard (2012: 45): 'The human animal […] practically establishes a new type of self-relation that constitutes consciousness of an object and not merely an animal awareness of it'. 35 As Hegel states: 'The animal follows its sensations [Empfindungen], its instinct.…”

Section: Luca Cortimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hegel's Later Theory of Cognition: An Additive or Transformative Model?

Corti¹

2021

Hegel Bulletin

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This article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities. These often unremarked upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between human and animal minds—two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation (Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory.

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Section: Luca Cortimentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 34 On this point, see Bourgeois (1994), Brinkmann (1998) and Pinkard (2012: 45): ‘The human animal […] practically establishes a new type of self-relation that constitutes consciousness of an object and not merely an animal awareness of it’.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%